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Résumé: La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » 
dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes conceptions de la place 
de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Cet article examinera la liberté de religion dans 
le contexte constitutionnel canadien. Nous avons choisi d’étudier la liberté de religion dans trois 
vagues successives : avant l’entrée en vigueur de la Déclaration canadienne des droits, sous la 
Déclaration canadienne des droits; et enfin, après l’entrée en vigueur de la Charte canadienne des 
droits et libertés. De plus, l’accommodement ainsi que de la proportionnalité de la liberté de 
religion d’un individu sera également traité. Ainsi que nous le démontrerons, la liberté de religion 
a engendré un repositionnement de l’individu face aux intérêts de la communauté ainsi qu’une 
réinterprétation des justifications menant à la sauvegarde de ces croyances.  
 
Summary: Freedom of religion, often recognised as “first freedom” in numerous legal 
traditions, also reflects the different conceptions of the place of the individual and the collectivity 
in society. This article will examine freedom of religion in the Canadian constitutional context. I 
have elected to study freedom of religion in three successive waves: first, before the enactment of 
the Canadian Bill of Rights; second, under the Canadian Bill of Rights; lastly, after the enactment 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Moreover, the accommodation as well as the 
proportionality of one’s freedom of religion is also addressed. Freedom of religion, as it shall be 
demonstrated, has engendered a re-positioning of individual and community interests as well as a 
reinterpretation of the justifications leading to the safeguarding of these beliefs.  
 
                                                 
1 (Lawyer), B.A., LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D. (Candidate). The study of freedom of religion should be understood as the 
backdrop to my analysis of freedom of conscience in my master’s thesis entitled “Triangulation of Rights, Balancing 
of Interests: Exploring the Tensions between Freedom of Conscience and Freedom of Religion in Comparative 
Constitutional Law”, LL.M., Faculty of Graduate Studies, Université de Montréal, 2010. In this sense, I will attempt 
to redress the composition of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience in an effort to better understand these 
two fundamentally interrelated freedoms. 
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Introduction 
 
In this article, I will examine the relationship between freedom of conscience and freedom 
of religion, as protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The study of 
freedom of religion should be understood as the background to my study on freedom of 
conscience. Freedom of religion is present, as is its sister freedom of conscience, in constitutional 
as well as quasi-constitutional documents; their fates are unequivocally and conceptually linked. 
In this sense, I will attempt to redress the composition of freedom of religion and freedom of 
conscience in an effort to better understand these two fundamentally interrelated freedoms.  
 
Freedom of religion has benefited from a long tradition of existence in Canada. However, 
this right has never been perceived as being absolute: in this way, not only should the 
development of freedom of religion (together with its limits) be examined but also its 
accommodation. While it is beyond my scope of study to trace a linear history of freedom of 
religion, I have elected to examine freedom of religion under three successive waves: first, before 
the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights (1.1); second, under the Canadian Bill of Rights 
(1.2); lastly, after the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1.3). I have 
labelled these waves as follows: ‘witnessing’ religion; ‘observing’ religion; and ‘protecting’ 
religion. By ‘witnessing’ religion I intend to examine the period under the British North America 
Act and thus before the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights. This period is of interest since it 
marks the increasingly visible minority religious groups. By ‘observing’ religion, I plan to analyse 
the situation of religious freedom under the Canadian Bill of Rights, where freedom of religion 
was acknowledged but its protection was severely limited in scope. Finally, ‘contextualising’ 
religion refers to freedom of religion as protected as a fundamental freedom under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
 
My objective is to present a jurisprudential view of religion up to the definition of religion 
set by the Supreme Court in Amselem (1.3.1). The aftermath of Amselem is addressed further on 
in my study (1.3.2). While it is uncontested that freedom of religion has developed most 
profoundly in the Charter era, I consider it necessary to contextualise its progress. Finally, I will 
examine how a violation of freedom of religion can be addressed in law (1.4), through the duty to 
accommodate religion within reasonable limits (1.4.1) and under the proportionality lens of the 
Oakes’ test (1.4.2). 
 
In a second section, I will address, without purporting to settle them all, certain unresolved 
issues pertaining to freedom of religion in Canada, namely: the sincerity of the belief of the 
individual (2.1), the place of expert evidence and the impact on community views of religion (2.2) 
and a child’s right to freedom of conscience and religion (2.3). I will also offer, in closing, a brief 
conclusion on freedom of religion in Canada (2.4). 
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To the extent that freedom of religion has been, as I shall demonstrate, the main concern 
of Canadian courts since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, I will 
thus first address the constitutional interpretation of that "first freedom".  
 
 
 
1. Freedom of Religion: a Retrospective 
 
  
1.1 Witnessing Religion: Prior to the Canadian Bill of Rights 
 
 
The British North America Act2 established a roadmap for the union of Canada and 
indicated the federal division of powers. It did not, however, confer individual rights, never mind 
religious rights3. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in one of his last articles as a law professor, trenchantly 
set aside the BNA Act for ‘its lack of principles, ideals, or other frills”4. Under the BNA Act, 
religion was conceptualised in terms of majority-minority group setting5 and thus special status 
was granted to certain minority groups, namely through education provisions6. For instance, 
whereas the laws on marriage were of federal competence7, the solemnization of marriage was 
 
2 British North America Act, (1867) 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3. (U.K.) [BNA Act]. 
3 In Saumur v. City of Québec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 [Saumur], Kerwin J. explained that Canada did not have a Bill 
of Rights at page 324: “We have not a Bill of Rights such as is contained in the United States Constitution and 
decisions on that part of the latter are of no assistance. While it is true that, as recited in the preamble to the British 
North America Act the three Provinces expressed a desire to be federally united with a constitution similar in 
principle to that of the United Kingdom, a complete division of legislative powers being effected by the Act, I 
assume as it was assumed in Re Adoption Act 18, (with reference, it is true, to entirely different matters) that 
Provincial Legislatures are willing and able to deal with matters of importance and substance that are within their 
legislative jurisdiction. It is perhaps needless to say that nothing in the foregoing has reference to matters that are 
confined to Parliament.” 
4 As quoted by Margaret H. Ogilvie, “Between liberté and égalité : Religion and the state in Canada” in Peter 
Radan, Denise Meyerson and Rosalind F. Croucher, eds., Law and Religion: God, the State and the Common Law 
(London, Routledge, 2005), 134 at 135 [Ogilvie, “Between liberté and égalité”], citing Kevin J. Christiano, “Church 
and State in Institutional Flux: Canada and the United States” in David Lyon and Marguerite Van Die, eds., 
Rethinking Church, State, and Modernity (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2000), 69 at p. 73. 
5 According to Ogilvie, ibid, at 137 [notes omitted]: “[b]etween 1867 and 1982, religion was subjected to 
constitutional judicial review in relation to temperance and Sunday closing legislation as promoted by the Social 
Gospel movement, as well as ongoing s 93 denominational school funding disputes.” 
6 BNA Act, supra note 2, s. 93. Québec and Newfoundland have opted out of the aforementioned educational 
provisions: see s. 93A of the BNA Act and Constitution Amendment, 1997 (Quebec), SI/97-141 and Constitutional 
Amendment, 1998 (Newfoundland), SI/98-25.  
7 Ibid, s. 91(26). 
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deemed a provincial matter8. Moreover, s. 92(13) and 92(16) of the BNA Act could also be read as 
applying to (religious) civil rights9.  
 
In this way, it was not surprising that certain minority religious groups, such as 
Mennonites, Hutterites and Jehovah’s Witnesses, found more than their fair share of cases before 
the courts. In particular, the increasing visibility of Jehovah’s Witnesses and protracted friction 
with both the Roman Catholic Church and State amplified adjudication before the courts in the 
1950s in Québec. During this period, religious beliefs were thought to be at odds with criminal 
code provisions10, provincial licensing laws11 as well as municipal by-laws12, implicating each 
level of government in turn.  
 
The distribution of a pamphlet was at the centre of the controversy in Boucher and was 
entitled “Québec’s burning hatred for God and Christ and freedom is the shame of all Canada”. 
While a highly divided Supreme Court (Rinfret C.J., Taschereau, Cartwright and Fauteux JJ. 
dissenting) found that the accusation of seditious libel was ultimately unfounded due to lack of 
evidence in Boucher, the hostile passages in the pamphlets questioned the ‘good will’ between the 
people of Québec and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Justice Rand thoughtfully and thoroughly dissected 
the act of sedition13 and opined that differences in ideas were indispensable: 
 
“Freedom in thought and speech and disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on 
every conceivable subject, are of the essence of our life. The clash of critical 
discussion on political, social and religious subjects has too deeply become 
the stuff of daily experience to suggest that mere ill-will as a product of 
controversy can strike down the latter with illegality. A superficial 
examination of the word shows its insufficiency: what is the degree necessary 
to criminality? Can it ever, as mere subjective condition, be so? 
Controversial fury is aroused constantly by differences in abstract concep-
 
8 Ibid, s. 92(12). 
9 This was noted by Rand J. in Saumur, supra note 3, 329. See BNA Act, supra note 2, s. 92(13) and 92(16): “92. In 
each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of 
Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, - 
[…] 
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province. 
[…] 
16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.” 
10 Boucher  v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265 [Boucher]. 
11 Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121 [Roncarelli]. 
12 Saumur, supra note 3. 
13 For an interesting discussion on the common law definition of sedition, see Luc B. Tremblay, The Rule of Law, 
Justice, and Interpretation (Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997), 112-115. According to the author at 
page 122, Justice Cartwright’s interpretation of sedition in Boucher “was consistent with the orthodox doctrine of 
the sovereignty of Parliament. The paramount guiding point of view was the legislative intention and, insofar as one 
tries to infer it from the pre-existing state of law, that intention was reasonably clear.” 
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tions; heresy in some fields is again a mortal sin; there can be fanatical 
puritanism in ideas as well as in mortals; but our compact of free society 
accepts and absorbs these differences and they are exercised at large within 
the frame-work of freedom and order on broader and deeper uniformities 
as bases of social stability. Similarly in discontent, affection and hostility: as 
subjective incidents of controversy, they and the ideas which arouse them are 
part of our living which ultimately serve us in stimulation, in the clarification 
of thought and, as we believe, in the search for the constitution and truth of 
things generally.”14 
 
While the distributed pamphlet was undoubtedly inflammatory, Justice Rand’s comments 
still resonate, emphasising the need for difference in opinions, difference actually strengthens the 
foundations of the social framework. 
 
The legality of distributing pamphlets was once again raised in Saumur, where a less 
divided Supreme Court (Rinfret C.J. and Taschereau J. dissenting) had to determine whether 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were entitled to free exercise and enjoyment of their religious profession and 
worship15. At issue was clause 2 of By-Law 184 of the City of Québec, which stipulated that no 
pamphlets – amongst other forms of communication – should be handed out without having 
previously obtained the written permission of the Chief of Police. While By-Law 184 unearthed 
questions of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court ultimately decided that the plaintiff should not be 
found guilty of contravening the aforementioned municipal by-law. Subjected to harsh criticism 
by certain judges, the by-law was deemed to be overly broad and imprecise in the language 
employed. The unintended outcome of this was a tangle in the division of powers and a curtailing 
of constitutional protections16. Saumur furthermore demonstrated the historical legacy of religious 
freedom in Canada, as put once again so eloquently by Justice Rand:  
 
14 Boucher, supra note 10, 288 [my emphasis]. 
15 While Kerwin J. noted that even though Jehovah’s Witnesses would not consider belonging to a « religion », he 
stated that they were entitled to enjoy their religious tenets, whether they are through worship or sharing the message 
of their faith: see Saumur, supra note 3, 299, 321. 
16 As stated by Justice Rand in Saumur, supra note 3, 333: “In our political organization, as in federal structures 
generally, that is the condition of legislation by any authority within it: the courts must be able from its language and 
its relevant circumstances, to attribute an enactment to a matter in relation to which the legislature acting has been 
empowered to make laws. That principle inheres in the nature of federalism; otherwise, authority, in broad and 
general terms, could be conferred which would end the division of powers. Where the language is sufficiently 
specific and can fairly be interpreted as applying only to matter within the enacting jurisdiction, that attribution will 
be made; and where the requisite elements are present, there is the rule of severability. But to authorize action which 
may be related indifferently to a variety of incompatible matters by means of the device of a discretionary license 
cannot be brought within either of these mechanisms; and the Court is powerless, under general language that 
overlaps exclusive jurisdictions, to delineate and preserve valid power in a segregated form. If the purpose is street 
regulation, taxation, registration or other local object, the language must, with sufficient precision, define the 
matter and mode of administration; and by no expedient which ignores that requirement can constitutional 
limitations be circumvented.” [my emphasis] 
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“From 1760, therefore, to the present moment religious freedom has, in our 
legal system, been recognized as a principle of fundamental character; and 
although we have nothing in the nature of an established church, that the 
untrammelled affirmations of ‘religious belief’ and its propagation, 
personal or institution, remain as of the greatest constitutional significance 
throughout the Dominion is unquestionable.”17 
 
“That legislation "in relation" to religion and its profession is not a local or 
private matter would seem to me to be self-evident: the dimensions of this 
interest are nationwide; it is even today embodied in the highest level of the 
constitutionalism of Great Britain; it appertains to a boundless field of ideas, 
beliefs and faiths with the deepest roots and loyalties; a religious incident 
reverberates from one end of this country to the other, and there is nothing 
to which the "body politic of the Dominion" is more sensitive.”18 
 
Reference to the Dominion provided an opening into the affirmation of an alleged 
“implied bill of rights”. The fundamental freedoms of speech, assembly, association, press, and 
religion, inherited from the United Kingdom were made part of the Constitution by the preamble 
of the BNA Act19.  
 
Following the overture in Saumur, equality of religions was addressed in Chaput v. 
Romain20, where Taschereau J. (speaking for Kerwin and Estey JJ.), explained that individual 
liberty existed with regard to religion21. The Supreme Court asserted that in this light, the police 
 
17 Saumur, supra note 3, 327 [my emphasis]. 
18 Ibid, 329 [my emphasis]. 
19 As noted by Beetz J. (speaking for the majority) in Attorney General (Canada) and Dupond v. City of Montréal, 
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 770, 796 [Dupond]. Dupond is largely credited for having “killed” the doctrine of the implied Bill 
of Rights. The Preamble of the BNA Act, supra note 128, states: “Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, 
and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom: 
And whereas such a Union would conduce to the Welfare of the Provinces and promote the Interests of the British 
Empire:  And whereas on the Establishment of the Union by Authority of Parliament it is expedient, not only that 
the Constitution of the Legislative Authority in the Dominion be provided for, but also that the Nature of the 
Executive Government therein be declared: And whereas it is expedient that Provision be made for the eventual 
Admission into the Union of other Parts of British North America:” 
20 Chaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834 [Chaput]. 
21Chaput, supra note 20, 840: “In our country there is no state religion. All religions are on an equal footing, and 
Catholics as well as Protestants, Jews, and other adherents to various religious denominations, enjoy the most 
complete liberty of thought. The conscience of each is a personal matter and the concern of nobody else. It would be 
distressing to think that a majority might impose its religious views upon a minority, and it would also be a shocking 
error to believe that one serves his country or his religion by denying in one Province, to a minority, the same rights 
which one rightly claims for oneself in another Province.” 
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were wrong to break up a meeting of Jehovah’s Witnesses in an individual’s house, especially 
when accomplished without warrants or following appropriate procedure.  
 
Roncarelli provided the final piece of the “witnessing religion” era: although primarily a 
personal action, this case challenged the extent of a public officer’s discretionary role. At that 
time, the defendant Maurice Duplessis was Attorney-General and Premier of Québec. At issue 
was whether an individual can be sanctioned economically for having expressed his religious 
views as a Jehovah’s Witness. More particularly, the court examined whether a liquor license 
could be revoked because the individual chose to bail out his fellow believers. Once again, as 
noted by author Luc B. Tremblay, Justice Rand’s opinion emerged and was accepted as the most 
important22. Justice Rand found that the permanent disqualification of the plaintiff from economic 
life was above and beyond the realm of discretionary powers held by the Premier23. 
Fundamentally, this case highlighted the historic disadvantage of religious subgroups and their 
often arbitrary treatment by not only greater society but also governmental actors24. 
  
The era prior to the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights proved to be very dark for 
certain minority groups in Canada. Some, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, clashed greatly with the 
established Catholic Church in Québec while others found ways to cohabitate more quietly. While 
statutes protected religious beliefs to a certain extent, dating as back as far as the pre-
Confederation period25 and as recently as the Freedom of Worship Act26 in Québec, the 
“witnessing religion” era provided the observer with fractured dialogues on religious values.   
 
 
 
 
22Tremblay, supra note 13, 115. 
23Roncarelli, supra note 11, 141 (Rand J.): “To deny or revoke a permit because a citizen exercises an 
unchallengeable right totally irrelevant to the sale of liquor in a restaurant is equally beyond the scope of the 
discretion conferred. There was here not only revocation of the existing permit but a declaration of a future, defini-
tive disqualification of the appellant to obtain one: it was to be "forever". This purports to divest his citizenship 
status of its incident of membership in the class of those of the public to whom such a privilege could be extended. 
Under the statutory language here, that is not competent to the Commission and a fortiori to the government or the 
respondent.” [references omitted] 
24This point was underlined by L’Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting) in Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, ¶ 80 
[Adler]. 
25As cited in Saumur, supra note 3, at 321: “ […] However, an argument was advanced based upon a pre-
Confederation statute of 1852 of the old Province of Canada, 14-15 Viet. e. 175, the relevant part of which 
provides:— 
the free exercise and enjoyment of Religious Profession and Worship, without discrimination or preference, so as 
the same be not made an excuse for acts of licentiousness, or a justification of practices inconsistent with the peace 
and safety of the Province, is by the constitution and laws of this Province allowed to all Her Majesty's subjects 
within the same.” 
26 Freedom of Worship Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 307. 
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1.2 Observing Religion: Under the Canadian Bill of Rights 
 
 
The enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights in 196027 presented Canadians with a more 
tangible protection of religion28, though limited to matters within the legislative authority of the 
Parliament of Canada29. The Parliament sought, however, to make the Canadian Bill of Rights 
relevant to the society into which this law was to be introduced30, by employing verbs such as 
“recognized” and “declared”31.  
 
The confluence of criminal law and religious freedom was once again at the forefront in 
Robertson and Rosetanni v. R.32, in which the majority of the Supreme Court – under Ritchie J. – 
sought to emphasise the effect of the Lord’s Day Act rather than its purpose33. The Lord’s Day 
Act was recognised as being purely “secular and financial”34 rather than having “abrogate[d], 
abridge[d], or infringe[d] or authorize[d] the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of religious 
freedom.”35 Therefore, it was deemed not to have contravened the Bill of Rights. The Lord’s Day 
Act was later found to be religious in purpose under the Charter era, where, this time, its 
constitutionality was discussed rather than its application36.  
 
Before concluding on ‘observing religion’, I consider it necessary to highlight the human 
rights’ progress made at the provincial level, showing that the country was indeed operating on 
 
27 Canadian Bill of Rights (1960, c. 44 ) [Canadian Bill of Rights]. 
28 Ibid, s. 1(c): “It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist 
without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, namely, 
[…] 
(c) freedom of religion” [my emphasis] 
29 Canadian Bill of Rights, supra note 27, s. 5(2) and 5(3). 
30 As stated by Ritchie J. in Robertson and Rosetanni v. R., [1963] S.C.R. 651 [Robertson and Rosetanni], at p. 
654-655. See also s. 5 of the Canadian Bill of Rights. 
31 Robertson and Rosetanni, ibid, 654: “It is to be noted at the outset that the Canadian Bill of Rights is not 
concerned with "human rights and fundamental freedoms" in an abstract sense, but rather with such "rights and 
freedoms" as they existed in Canada immediately before the statute was enacted [...] It is therefore the "religious 
freedom" then existing in this country that is safe-guarded by the provisions of s. 2...” 
32 Robertson and Rosetanni, supra note 30, 654. 
33 Ibid, 567. 
34 Ibid, 567. 
35 Ibid, 568. 
36 Ibid, 560-562. At 562, Cartwright J. stated: “Whether the imposition, under penal sanctions, of a certain standard 
of religious conduct on the whole population is desirable is, of course, a question for Parliament to decide. But in 
enacting the Canadian Bill of Rights Parliament has thrown upon the courts the responsibility of deciding, in each 
case in which the question arises, whether such an imposition infringes the freedom of religion in Canada.” In Big 
M. Drug Mart, Dickson J. distinguished between the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms: the former was seen as declarative whereas the latter was interpreted as imperative: see R. v. Big M. 
Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [Big M. Drug Mart], ¶ 114-115. 
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two speeds of rights. While not the first province to adopt a human rights code in Canada37, it was 
the breadth of protection afforded to its citizens which made Québec’s Charter of Human Rights 
and Freedoms38 singular39. Propitious, given the international pacts that came into force around 
the time of its adoption40, the Québec Charter found its meaning within the leading texts on 
human rights41. The Québec Charter sought to protect conscience and religion, not only as 
fundamental freedoms42, but also, in the case of religion, as prohibited grounds of 
discrimination43, except when a distinction based on aptitudes exist44. 
 
Religion was observed, rather as a passing occurrence than addressed as a tangible 
concern in this section. Limited by its own legislative existence, the Canadian Bill of Rights only 
extended to the “Law of Canada” and the jurisdiction of the Parliament45. While its existence was 
recognised, religion (and by extension religious values) did not foster a constructive dialogue in 
constitutional law, since its meaning and scope was deemed frozen to its pre-Canadian Bill of 
Rights status.  
 
 
37 See: Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act, 1947, S.S. 1947, c.35; Ontario Human Rights Code S.O. 1961-62, c.93; 
Nova Scotia Human Rights Act S.N.S. 1963 c.5; Alberta Human Rights Act S.A. 1966, c.39 and Individual Rights 
Protection Act S.A. 1972, c.2; New Brunswick Human Rights Act S.N.B. 1967 c. 13; P.E.I. Human Rights Act S. 
P.E.I. 1968 c. 24; Newfounland Human Rights Act S. Nfld. 1969, No. 75; British Columbia Human Rights Act S.B.C. 
1969 c.10; Manitoba Human Rights Act S.M 1970, c.104. 
38 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, L.R.Q. c. C-12 (adopted on June 27th 1975, enacted in law on June 28th, 
1976) [Québec Charter]. 
39 Professor André Morel, in a 1987 article, referred to the Québec Charter as being of unequalled scope since 1975: 
see André Morel, “La Charte québécoise: un document unique dans l’histoire legislative canadienne”, (1987) 21 
R.J.T. 1, 16. 
40 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1976) 999 R.T.N.U. 171; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (1976) 993 R.T.N.U. 3. 
41 See Michèle Rivet, « Entre stabilité et fluidité : le juge, arbitre des valeurs » in TRIBUNAL DES DROITS DE LA 
PERSONNE AND BARREAU DU QUÉBEC, La Charte des droits et libertés de la personne : pour qui et jusqu’où? 
(Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2005), 1 at 5-6. 
42 Québec Charter, supra note 38, art. 3: “Every person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful 
assembly and freedom of association.” 
43 Ibid, art. 10: 
“Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without 
distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except 
as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap 
or the use of any means to palliate a handicap. 
Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing such 
right.” 
44 Québec Charter, supra note 38, art. 20: “A distinction, exclusion or preference based on the aptitudes or 
qualifications required for an employment, or justified by the charitable, philanthropic, religious, political or 
educational nature of a non-profit institution or of an institution devoted exclusively to the well-being of an ethnic 
group, is deemed non-discriminatory.” 
45 Supra, note 29. 
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1.3 Protecting Religion: Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
 
 
The Charter heralded a new era for religious freedom in Canada, namely by protecting it 
as a constitutionally recognised46 fundamental freedom47. While it is readily acknowledged that 
the history of freedom of religion under the Charter represents a self-contained dissertation and 
has been addressed in extenso by authors48, I have elected to use this as the backdrop of my study. 
The contextual study of freedom of religion will be presented in two parts: from Sunday closings 
to opening prayers (1.3.1) and from sincere individual beliefs to profoundly communitarian 
interests (1.3.2). While the first part spans both secular and religious Sunday closing laws up to 
requirements of secularism and non-sectarianism in public settings, the second part of the study 
will examine the development of a test on the sincerity of belief to the implications for collective 
beliefs.  
 
 
1.3.1 From Sunday Closings to Opening Prayers 
 
 
The Lord’s Day Act has become the connecting thread between epochs of religious 
freedom. Viewed as having an essentially “secular and financial” purpose in Robertson and 
Rosetanni, the Lord’s Day Act took on new meaning in R. v. Big M. Drug Mart, where “freedom 
of conscience and religion” was interpreted for the first time. Dickson J. – as he then was, and 
writing for Beetz, McIntyre, Chouinard and Lamer JJ. – explained that the aforementioned act 
could not be interpreted as having secular connotations49, since it brandished its religious purpose 
 
46 The primacy of the Constitution of Canada is guaranteed by s. 52(1) of the Constitutional Act of Canada, which 
states that the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada. Freedom of conscience and religion is protected 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitutional Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c. 11 [Canadian Charter].  
47 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ibid, s. 2a): “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
a) freedom of conscience and religion”. 
48 See, for example: Paul Horowitz, “The Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: 
Section 2(a) and Beyond” (1996) 54 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1 [Horowitz, “Sources and Limits”]; David M. Brown, 
“Freedom from or Freedom for? Religion as a Case Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights” (2000) 33 
UBC L. Rev. 1 [Brown, “Religion as a Case Study”]; José Woehrling, “L’obligation d’accommodement 
raisonnable et l’adaptation de la société à la diversité religieuse” (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 325 [Woehrling, 
“L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable”]; Benjamin Berger, “The Limits of Belief: Freedom of Religion, 
Secularism and the Liberal State” (2002) 17 C.J.L.S. 39 [Berger, “Limits of Belief”]; Pierre Bosset and Paul Eid, 
« Droit et religion : de l’accommodement raisonnable à un dialogue internormatif ? », (2007) 41 R.J.T. 513 [Bosset 
& Eid, “Droit et religion”]; Richard Moon, ed., Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver, UBC Press, 
2008) [Moon, Law and Religious Pluralism]. 
49 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 36, ¶ 78. Although factually similar to Big M. Drug Mart, Robertson and Rosetanni 
must be distinguished, since the latter case was decided on the application and not the constitutionality (and thus 
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overtly50. Furthermore, a holistic approach to evaluating the Lord’s Day Act was suggested: it 
should be evaluated on the basis of effect and purpose rather than effect or purpose51. This 
approach also followed Justice Dickson’s interpretation of section 2(a) as a “single integrated 
concept”52. As such, the religious purpose of the Lord’s Day Act was sufficient to demonstrate a 
breach of freedom of conscience and religion53 and no section 1 analysis was conducted. Hence, 
Dickson J. encapsulated the fundamental freedom as followed: 
 
“A truly free society is one which can accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, 
diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conduct.  A free society 
is one which aims at equality with respect to the enjoyment of fundamental 
freedoms and I say this without any reliance upon s. 15 of the Charter.  
Freedom must surely be founded in respect for the inherent dignity and the 
inviolable rights of the human person.  The essence of the concept of 
freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a 
person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without 
fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by 
worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. But the concept 
means more than that. 
 
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or 
constraint. If a person is compelled by the state or the will of another to a 
course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have chosen, he is 
not acting of his own volition and he cannot be said to be truly free. One of 
the major purposes of the Charter is to protect, within reason, from 
compulsion or restraint. Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of 
compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of 
sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or 
limit alternative courses of conduct available to others. Freedom in a broad 
 
purpose) of the legislation: see Big M. Drug Mart, supra, ¶ 86-88. This is not to say, however, that all statutes 
proclaiming a common day of rest should be considered as having a religious purpose: see R. v. Edwards Books and 
Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [Edwards Books], where the Supreme Court declared that the economic burden 
existed independently of the impugned legislation for the Saturday observers. 
50 As noted by Dickson J., the religious purpose of the Lord’s Day Act had been conceded by the Attorney General 
for Alberta: see Big M Drug Mart, supra note 36, ¶ 79-80. 
51 In this way, Dickson J. is also rejecting the “shifting purpose” argument presented, which suggested “new 
appreciations” and “re-assessments” of existing legislation. See Big M. Drug Mart, supra note 36, ¶ 93: “While the 
effect of such legislation as the Lord’s Day Act may be more secular today than it was in 1677 or in 1906, such a 
finding cannot justify a conclusion that its purpose has similarly changed. In result, therefore, the Lord’s Day Act 
must be characterized as it has always been, a law the primary purpose of which is the compulsion of sabbatical 
observance.” 
52 Big M. Drug Mart, supra note 36, ¶ 120. 
53 Ibid, ¶ 79-85. 
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sense embraces both the absence of coercion and constraint, and the right 
to manifest beliefs and practices. Freedom means that, subject to such 
limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be 
forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.”54 
 
In this way, freedom of conscience and religion – much like all other rights and freedoms 
contained in the Charter – is not an absolute right55, but rather one that is subject to limitations, 
given the intrinsic coexistence of each individual’s fundamental freedoms, as well as the 
reasonable limits imposed within a free and democratic society56.  
 
Thus not all Sunday closing laws can be considered religious in nature. The Supreme 
Court in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Limited57, explained that the Ontario Retail Business 
Holiday Act58, was enacted for the secular purpose of providing a uniform holidays for retail 
workers. An exemption was also provided in the act59. Nevertheless, while there was an admitted 
breach of certain shopkeepers’ religious and equality rights, the violation was regarded as justified 
within a free and democratic society. Edwards Books granted the Supreme Court with a further 
opportunity to explain the function of section 2(a) of the Charter, as articulated by Dickson C.J. 
(writing for Chouinard and Le Dain JJ.):  
 
“The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with 
profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, 
humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. 
These beliefs, in turn, govern one's conduct and practices. The Constitution 
shelters individuals and groups only to the extent that religious beliefs or 
conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened. For a state-imposed 
cost or burden to be proscribed by s. 2(a) it must be capable of interfering 
with religious belief or practice. In short, legislative or administrative action 
 
54Ibid, at, ¶ 94-95 [my emphasis]. 
55 As stated in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at ¶ 65 [Oakes]. As noted in Trinity Western University v. British 
Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 [Trinity Western] by Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ. (writing for 
the majority), at ¶ 29-31, “In our opinion, this is a case where any potential conflict should be resolved through the 
proper delineation of the rights and values involved. In essence, properly defining the scope of the rights avoids a 
conflict in this case. Neither freedom of religion nor the guarantee against discrimination based on sexual orientation 
is absolute. […] In addition, the Charter should be read as a whole, so that one right is not privileged at the expense 
of another.” In TWU, the majority of the Supreme Court found that while the TWU Community Standards aimed to 
circumscribe the conduct of its members, one could not conclude that these measures would translate to intolerant 
behaviour in public schools; furthermore, the Court concluded that alternative protections existed to protect both 
minority practices and the population at large: see TWU, ¶ 32-33. 
56 The issue of reasonable limits in a free and democratic society will be discussed further on. 
57 Edwards Books, supra note 47.  
58 Retail Business Holidays Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 453, ss. 2(1), 3(4).  
59 Ibid, ss. 2(1), 3(4). See Edwards Books, supra note 47, ¶ 115-120, ¶ 144. 
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which increases the cost of practising or otherwise manifesting religious 
beliefs is not prohibited if the burden is trivial or insubstantial”60 
 
Interestingly, Edwards Books also distinguished freedom of conscience from freedom of 
religion. Dickson J. (as he was then) proffered that section 2(a) of the Charter be interpreted as a 
“single integrated concept” in Big M. Drug Mart but found in Edwards Books that freedom of 
religion, unlike freedom of conscience, had both individual and collective aspects61. While this 
did not create a discrepancy in interpretation, it can be inferred that conscience and religion, as 
fundamental freedoms, are not in fact interchangeable. This point will be addressed in further 
detail later on in the study. 
 
The issue of the insubstantial burden on religious beliefs was addressed by the Supreme 
Court the same year in The Queen v. Jones62. The appellant, Thomas Larry Jones, pastor of a 
fundamentalist church, had taken on the education of twenty or so children under a schooling 
programme called “Western Baptist Academy”. This case opposed the right of parents to educate 
their children according to their beliefs and provincial compulsory education63. The appellant 
refused to request a state permit for his private school and also refused to send his own children to 
public schools since, in his view, education was mandated by God and not accountable to 
government64. In this way, the appellant argued that the Alberta School Act infringed on his 
section 2(a) and section 7 Charter rights. Although both arguments ultimately failed65, Justices 
McIntyre (writing for Beetz and Le Dain JJ.) and Wilson concurred that the Alberta School Act 
accommodated religious freedom. Wilson J. opined alone, however, that the appellant’s s. 7 
Charter rights were violated66.  
 
Moreover, the Charter has offered “freedom from conformity” for minority religious 
groups. This point was emphasised strongly not only in Big M. Drug Mart, but also in the so-
 
60 Edwards Books, supra note 49, ¶ 97 [references omitted], as stated by Wilson J. (dissent.) in R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 
S.C.R. 284 [Jones], ¶ 67.    
61 Edwards Books, supra note 49, ¶ 144. 
62 Jones, supra note 60. 
63 School Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-3, ss. 142(1), 143(1) [Alberta School Act]. 
64 Jones, supra note 60, ¶ 2-3, 19. The stalemate was niftily summed up by the trial judge in this case. See Jones, ¶ 
6: “Section 143(1)(a) has given rise to what the trial judge has described as a standoff between "a stiff-necked 
parson and a stiff-necked education establishment, both demanding the other make the first move in the inquiry to 
determine whether the children are receiving efficient instruction outside the public or separate school system".” 
65 Jones, supra note 60, ¶ 33, 48-49 (Laforest J., writing for the majority). 
66 Wilson J. offered a broad interpretation of the concept of liberty, though noting that this right did not give carte 
blanche on how to bring up and educate one’s children: see Jones, supra note 60, ¶ 76-77. Perhaps an intersection 
between freedom of conscience and religion and fundamental freedoms (in the sense of s. 7 of the Charter) occurs 
when Justice Wilson interprets the appellant’s real complaint as being effects-based rather than purpose-based; 
although Justice Wilson concludes that the appellant failed to show a substantial impact, this approach demonstrates 
the place of conscience in this context: Ibid, ¶ 67-69. 
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called ‘Elgin County’ cases67. These cases concerned the funding of education of denominational 
schools, as formulated by section 93 of the BNA Act, which reflected the political and “historical 
compromise” between Catholics and Protestants leading to Confederation, as noted in Adler68. Both 
Zylberberg and CCLA questioned whether the right to freedom of conscience and religion was 
breached by the school boards in question. Whereas the former decision questioned the 
constitutionality of prescribed religious exercises at the beginning or end of each day in public 
schools, the latter case concerned the constitutionality of the regulation and curriculum of the school 
board in question. As stated most recently by Chief Justice McLachlin (writing for Binnie, 
Deschamps and Rothstein JJ., concurring) in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony: “Canadian law 
reflects the fundamental proposition that the State cannot by law directly compel religious belief 
or practice. Thus this Court has held that if the purpose of a law is to interfere with religious 
practices, the law cannot be upheld […] To compel religious practice by force of law deprives the 
individual of the fundamental right to choose his or her mode of religious experience, or lack 
thereof.”69  While the Supreme Court judged it important that membership in a “discrete and insular 
minority” be recognised in Adler, section 93 of the BNA Act nevertheless confered a plenary power 
to the province. As underlined by Justice Iacobucci (writing for Lamer C.J.  and La Forest, Gonthier, 
Cory JJ.) one must distinguish between an ability and an obligation to pass legislation establishing 
and funding particular schools: “[i]f the plenary power is so insulated, then so is the proper exercise 
of it.”70  
 
Freedom of religion was further addressed in 1995 with B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society 
of Metropolitan Toronto71, where the majority of the Supreme Court refused to develop internal 
limits to the scope of freedom of religion. At issue was whether parents of a premature infant 
could object to a blood transfusion on the basis on their religious beliefs as Jehovah’s 
Witnesses72. The Supreme Court held that a broad interpretation of freedom of religion should be 
favoured, in order to balance competing rights under section one of the Charter73. According to 
La Forest J. (writing for the majority), this approach gave necessary context as well as a broad 
 
67 Big M. Drug Mart, supra note 36, ¶ 96; the ‘Elgin County’ cases are: Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education, 
1988 CanLII 189 (ON. CA), p. 19 [Zylberberg]; Canadian Civil Liberties Association. v. Ontario (Minister of 
Education), (1990), 71 O.R. (2d) 341 (C.A.) [CCLA]. See also Adler, supra note 24.  
68 Adler, supra, ¶ 29. 
69 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, ¶ 4 [references omitted]. 
70 Adler, supra note 24, ¶ 48; see also Wilson J. in Reference Re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, 1198 [Reference Re Bill 30]. 
71 B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 [Children’s Aid Society]. 
72 More specifically, the Supreme Court needed to determine whether “s. 19(1)(b)(ix) of the Ontario Child Welfare 
Act [R.S.O. 1980, c. 66 [rep. S.O. 1984, c. 55, s. 208]], which defines "child in need of protection", together with the 
powers in ss. 30(1)2 and 41 and the procedures in ss. 21, 27, 28(1), (10) and (12), denied parents a right to choose 
medical treatment for their infants, contrary to s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or infringed 
the appellants' freedom of religion as guaranteed under s. 2(a) of the Charter, and, if so, whether the infringement 
was justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter: Children’s Aid Society, ibid, 316-317. 
73 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 71, at 383-384; see also Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 
1 S.C.R. 825 [Ross], at ¶ 73-75. 
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power of judicial review74 when addressing complex and intermingling issues of freedom of 
conscience
 
“The protection of a child’s right to life and to health, when it becomes 
necessary to do so, is a basic tenet of our legal system, and legislation to that 
end accords with the principles of fundamental justice, so long, of course, as 
it also meets the requirements of fair procedure.”75    
 
The intrinsic vulnerability of young children also highlighted the importance of the State’s 
role, as underlined by Laforest J, as well as the amply justified restrictions on parental rights 
under the s. 1 Charter analysis76.  
 
74 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 71, at 389: “In my view, Charter rights should always be interpreted broadly. 
Apart from the fact that this brings in the full contextual picture in balancing them with other rights under s. 1, a 
narrower interpretation has the effect of forever narrowing the ambit of judicial review, and so limiting the scope of 
judicial intervention for the protection of the individual rights guaranteed under the Charter.” Justices Iacobucci and 
Major, agreeing with the result reached by La Forest J., opined that an outer boundary can also be ascribed to s. 2(a) 
of the Charter, much like that of s. 2(d), as remarked upon in Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 [Lavigne], at 320-21 (Laforest J.). An outer boundary was explained as follows by Justice 
Laforest in Lavigne at pages 320-321: “At the very fundamental level, it could certainly not have been intended that s. 
2(d) protect us against the association with others that is a necessary and inevitable part of membership in a democratic 
community, the existence of which the Charter clearly assumes. […] Thus I doubt that s. 2(d) can entitle us to be free of 
all legal obligations that flow from membership in a family.  And the same can be said of the workplace.  In short, there 
are certain associations which are accepted because they are integral to the very structure of society.” Returning to the s. 
2(a) Charter scope of Children’s Aid Society, supra note 71, at 438-439), Justices Iacobucci and Major explained that 
“[i]f s. 2(d) will not encompass the right to dissociate from institutions integral to the structure of society, we 
conclude by analogy that neither s. 2(a) nor the liberty interest of s. 7 permits parents to endanger the lives of their 
children. Expanding the substantive rights guarantees to cover such activity would, with greatest respect, render 
them meaningless owing to a lack of definition. Just because it is self-evident that a rights limitation shall be 
upheld as comporting with fundamental justice or s. 1 does not mean that it is necessary to proceed to this 
level of analysis.” 
75 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 71, 319. There must be a distinction, however, in the protection of children and 
of adolescents, since their ‘best interests’ differ, much like their capacity for autonomous choice. This was 
underscored recently by the Supreme Court in A.C. where the court discerned (Binnie J. dissenting) that the doctrine 
of the mature minor must be taken into account when faced with a decision concerning the liberty and security of the 
person: see A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, ¶ 102-108 [A.C.] 
(Abella J., writing for LeBel, Deschamps and Charron JJ. concurring). This decision will be examined in depth 
further on in our study. 
76 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 71, 385-386. In an addendum to his analysis, La Forest J. discussed the 
interpretation of his opinion by his colleagues Iacobucci and Major JJ., and noted at pages 387-388 that “The sole 
issue before us was that raised by the parents, i.e. that their constitutional rights were infringed in the circumstances 
in which medical treatment was given to the child. In such a case, the parent's rights must, under s. 1, be balanced 
against the interests of others in a free and democratic society -- in this particular case the right of their child. In that 
situation, I, not surprisingly, found the parent's rights were clearly overridden. If a situation arose where it was 
alleged that the child's right was violated, other rights might be raised as reasonable limits, but if the right alleged 
was the security of the child as in the present case, then the child's right would again prevail over a parent's rights. In 
short the issue raised governs the form, but not the substance of the analysis. […] I am happy to see that my 
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Freedom from religious discrimination, and more specifically freedom from constraint or 
coercion, has also appeared as a facet of freedom of conscience and religion77. This aspect could 
be better understood, I contend, if it were examined as freedom of religion as well as freedom of 
conscience. In this way, an argument can be made for a more substantial case law for freedom of 
conscience, all the while clarifying the reach of freedom of religion78. For example, in Freitag v. 
Penetanguishene79, the recital of a Christian prayer to commence a city council meeting was 
interpreted as imposing a Christian moral tone to the gathering80. Within an educational setting 
such as faced in Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 3681, it was found that requirements 
of secularism and non-sectarianism should prevail over religious considerations, thus conferring 
freedom from religion. These cases accentuate colliding interests of vulnerable groups, minority 
groups and those who make up the majority: ultimately, the neutrality of the State must prevail in 
order to safeguard the rights of not only the minorities but also the “interests of the majority”.  
Nevertheless, the very concept of the ‘neutral State’ also raises important questions in Canadian 
society. The notions of neutrality and freedom from religion, which have been traditionally 
articulated from the point of view of freedom of religion, would benefit from being re-examined 
from the perspective of freedom of conscience. 
 
The first half of the study of case law under the Charter has exemplified some of the 
important principles of freedom of religion: the presence of a positive right and a negative 
obligation of religious freedom82; the interpretation of section 2(a) as a ‘single integrated 
 
colleagues concede that the balancing of the competing rights could be integrated in a s. 1 analysis, since apart from 
specific provisions such as "fundamental justice", that is the only balancing mechanism provided under the Charter. 
The Charter makes no provision for directly balancing constitutional rights against one another. It is aimed rather at 
governmental and legislative intrusion against the protected rights; see s. 32 of the Charter.” [emphasis in original] 
77 Big M. Drug Mart, supra note 36, ¶ 96-97. 
78 This point will be addressed in depth further on in our study. 
79 Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), 1999 CanLII 3786 (Ont. C.A.) [Freitag]. 
80 Freitag, ibid. The Québec Tribunal for Human Rights has arrived at similar conclusions under the Québec 
Charter : see Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et droits de la jeunesse) c. Laval (Ville), 2006 CanLII 
33156 (QC T.D.P) [Laval]. The Commission des droits de la personne et droits de la jeunesse recently appealed for 
a respectful discussion of diverse opinions, following a recommendation that the town of Trois-Rivières stop 
reciting a prayer at the beginning of their municipal council meetings and replace it with a moment of contemplation 
instead. See COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DROITS DE LA JEUNESSE, <Communiqués>, <La prière au 
conseil municipal de Trois-Rivières (January 20,.2009)>, http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/fr/communiques/docs-
2009/COM_PriereTroisRivieres.pdf (site last accessed 31.03.2009. 
81 Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 2002 CSC 86, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 [Chamberlain], at ¶ 27: “The 
school board is the elected proxy of the collective local community, made up as it typically is of diverse 
subcommunities. The requirement of secularism means that the school board must consider the interests of all its 
constituents and not permit itself to act as the proxy of a particular religious view held by some members of the 
community, even if that group holds the majority of seats on the board.” 
82 The Supreme Court of Canada, in Big M. Drug Mart, supra note 36 at ¶ 94-95, explained that the concept of 
freedom of religion should be understood as the right to entertain religious beliefs, but also that each is entitled to 
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concept’; the presence of trivial or unsubstantial burdens on freedom of religion (which do not 
qualify as “violations” of this freedom); the need to favour a broad interpretation of freedom of 
religion; and the obligation to justify State deference or intervention with regard to religious 
freedom under s. 1 of the Charter83. In examining Sunday closings and opening prayers, the 
groundwork for freedom of religion has been set down, but certainly not in stone. Questions 
remain, therefore, as to the religious relationship between parent and child, the balance between 
individual beliefs and collective interests as well as the necessary balancing of rights and values 
in light of the Charter. This will be the focus of the following section. 
 
1.3.2 From Sincere Individual Beliefs to Profoundly Communitarian 
Interests  
 
Freedom of religion became overwhelming present at the Supreme Court in 2004, 
developing a broad definition of religion on the one hand84 and determining the religious 
neutrality of the State on the other85.  
 
I have elected to examine the case law unaccompanied by academic commentary in this 
section; the comments, criticisms and intellectual reflections of the legal community will be 
addressed in the final sections of my article when attending to unresolved issues pertaining to 
freedoms of conscience and religion. 
 
As mentioned earlier, at issue in Amselem was whether Orthodox Jews could erect 
succahs86 on their balconies in pursuance to their religious beliefs but contrary to the declaration 
of co-ownership.  Whereas the appellants claimed a breach under the Québec Charter, the 
majority of the Supreme Court explained that these principles were equally applicable under the 
Québec Charter and the Charter87. All judges agreed that the right to freedom of religion is not 
absolute88. However, it is with respect to the definition and scope of freedom of religion that 
 
their views. In this way, a positive and negative right to religion co-exist, which serves as a first parameter of the 
individual’s conception of religion. 
83 For further discussion on section 1 Charter analysis, see infra section 1.4.2. 
84 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 [Amselem]. 
85 Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de Saint-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650 
[Lafontaine].  
86 The succah is explained as follows in Amselem, supra note 84, at ¶ 5: “A succah is a small enclosed temporary hut 
or booth, traditionally made of wood or other materials such as fastened canvas, and open to the heavens, in which, 
it has been acknowledged, Jews are commanded to “dwell” temporarily during the festival of Succot, which 
commences annually with nightfall on the fifteenth day of the Jewish month of Tishrei. This nine-day festival, which 
begins in late September or early- to mid-October, commemorates the 40-year period during which, according to 
Jewish tradition, the Children of Israel wandered in the desert, living in temporary shelters.” 
87 Amselem, supra note 84, ¶ 37. 
88 This point was however strongly stressed by Bastarache J., writing for the minority: see Amselem, supra, ¶ 136. 
Freedom of religion under the Charter as well as the Québec Charter is subjected to reasonable limits, as established 
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Amselem is especially interesting. Iacobucci J. (writing for himself as well as for McLachlin C.J. 
and Major, Arbour and Fish JJ.) first explained that while defining religion precisely might not be 
possible, it would be useful to distinguish between what is considered to be rooted in religion and 
what is outside of the protection of freedom of religion (namely secular, socially based or 
conscientiously held beliefs):  
 
“[d]efined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and 
comprehensive system of faith and worship. Religion also tends to involve the 
belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power. In essence, religion is 
about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs connected to 
an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s self-definition 
and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow individuals to foster a 
connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual 
faith.”89  
 
Beyond this ‘outer’ definition of religion, Iacobucci J. explained that both obligatory as 
well as voluntary expressions of faith should be protected by the relevant Charters90. The 
emphasis on the individual’s subjective conception of freedom of religion resounds 
unmistakably91. Nevertheless, the right to freedom of religion will only be triggered once the 
individual has demonstrated the sincerity of his or her belief, which is determined according to the 
following test:  
 
“(1) he or she has a practice or belief, having a nexus with religion, which 
calls for a particular line of conduct, either by being objectively or 
subjectively obligatory or customary, or by, in general, subjectively 
engendering a personal connection with the divine or with the subject or 
object of an individual’s spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular 
practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity 
with the position of religious officials; and (2) he or she is sincere in his or 
her belief. » 92 
 
 
by sections 1 of the Charter as well as 9.1 of the Québec Charter, supra note 162. See also Amselem, supra, ¶ 152 
with regard to the scope of action of section 9.1 of the Québec Charter.  
89 Amselem, supra note 84, ¶ 39 [my emphasis]. 
90 Amselem, supra note 84, ¶ 47. 
91 Ibid, ¶ 42, where Iacobucci J. referred to Professor José Woehrling’s seminal text on freedom of religion, where 
he explained that the subjective aspect of the believer’s personal sincerity is in conformity with the established 
doctrine on this matter: see Woehrling, “L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable”, supra note 48, at 385. 
92 Amselem, supra note 84, ¶ 56 
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While readily admitting that the Court should not become the arbiter of religious dogma93, 
Amselem also acknowledged that expert testimony should not form the basis of the decision, 
distinguishing between what is relevant and what is necessary to satisfy the burden of proof94.  
 
Although the majority opinion in Amselem represents a new era of religious freedom 
claims in the Charter era, it would be remiss if the significant minority opinions went 
unaddressed (Binnie J. writing for himself95; Bastarache J., writing for Deschamps and LeBel JJ.). 
While the approach proposed by Bastarache J. did not differ substantially96 from that of the 
majority insofar as suggesting a test based on beliefs, he endorsed a more objective test. Two 
other points also stand out in Justice Bastarache’s interpretation of freedom of religion. First, 
expert testimony seemed to have been more valued97. Second, Bastarache J. also mentioned that 
the Québec Charter must be interpreted in harmony with the Civil Code of Québec98; in this 
sense, a distinction is made between the purpose of freedom of religion and the right to freedom 
of religion99. The minority opinions triangulated the wronged rights in a manner distinct from that 
of the majority100 and given the framing of the issue101, it is not surprising that the appeal would 
have been dismissed102.  
 
At issue in Lafontaine was the unjustified refusal of the municipality of the village of 
Lafontaine following repeated zoning requests from the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In this way, the 
municipality did not satisfy its obligation of procedural fairness toward the appellants. In a once 
again divided Court, the majority (composed of McLachlin C.J. as well as Iacobucci, Arbour, 
Fish and Binnie JJ.) held that the municipality had breached its obligation and sent the matter 
back before the municipality for reconsideration of the application. The majority addressed the 
facts of this case in a purely administrative perspective, whereas LeBel J., writing for minority 
ventured into the obligation of State neutrality. The minority opinion was voiced by the same as 
in Amselem, namely Lebel, Bastarache and Deschamps JJ. (Major J., writing a separate opinion). 
 
93 Ibid, ¶ 50 
94 Ibid, ¶ 54. On this point, see also Binnie J.’s opinion at ¶ 190. 
95 Binnie J. emphasised, from the start, due to the weight placed on the “private contract voluntarily made among the 
parties to govern their mutual rights and obligations, including the contractual rules contained in the declaration of 
co-ownership, as well as on the co-owners’ offer of accommodation.”: see Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 184-185. This 
approach is also echoed in his interpretation of the Québec Charter, which, in his view, is “concerned not only with 
rights and freedoms but with a citizen’s responsibilities to other citizens in the exercise of those rights and 
freedoms.”: Amselem, supra, ¶ 186. 
96 Amselem, supra note 84, ¶ 144 
97 Ibid, ¶ 140, 159. Bastarache J. employs “useful” to describe the input of expert testimony in discerning the 
fundamental precepts and practices of a religion.  
98 Ibid, ¶ 146, 165. I refer, of course, to the Civil Code of Québec, (L.Q., 1991, c. 64.)  [C.c.Q.]. 
99 Ibid, ¶ 146. 
100 Ibid, ¶ 176: “not only is there a conflict between the right to freedom of religion and property rights, but the right 
to freedom of religion is also in conflict with the right to life and personal security, and with contractual rights.” 
101 Ibid, ¶ 180. 
102 Ibid, ¶ 182. Binnie J. would have also dismissed the appeal at ¶ 210. 
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The minority, as expressed by LeBel J., underlined the importance of the negative aspect of 
freedom of religion by asserting the duty of religious neutrality of the state and public 
authorities103. As such, the municipality would be breaching its obligation of neutrality by 
providing the appellants with further assistance104. LeBel J. would have dismissed the appeal on 
the basis that the religious beliefs and practices of the Jehovah’s Witnesses do not exempt them 
from complying with municipal by-laws105. I note that LeBel J. continued his judgment in view 
of a hypothetical situation in which no land was available in the designated zone, alluding to 
potential positive obligations imposed upon the State institution on the basis of freedom of 
religion106. Finally, I mention that Major J. would agree with the result in the judgment of LeBel 
J., but limits himself to the findings of fact107. 
 
Bruker v. Marcovitz108 provided further fertile terrain for the development of freedom of 
religion by the Supreme Court in 2007. At issue in this case was the refusal of the husband to give 
his wife a get, a divorce under Jewish law (Halakhic law) after obtaining a divorce under civil 
law109, and this, despite the fact that a standing agreement had been negotiated (known as the 
Consent to Corollary Relief). More specifically, Clause 12 of the aforementioned agreement110 
stipulated that the parties would appear before the Jewish rabbinical court (known as the Beth 
Din), to obtain a get immediately. The husband did not comply with this clause and only appeared 
before the Beth Din fifteen years later. The wife chose to institute civil proceedings against her 
husband, alleging that he had been in breach of contract and was thus liable under civil law for 
damages. Under Jewish law, only the husband is apt to give the get; without consent, the wife 
remains an agunah, or a “woman in chains” or “wife in chains”111. The husband argued that the 
agreement was not valid under civil law and that by seeking damages, his right to freedom of 
 
103 Lafontaine, supra note 85, ¶ 65. 
104 Ibid, ¶ 71 in fine. 
105 Ibid, ¶ 72. 
106 Ibid, ¶ 73-93. 
107 Ibid, ¶ 36. 
108 Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] 3 R.C.S. 607 [“Bruker”] 
109 The Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), was reformed in 1990 following the alliance of B’Nai Brith, the 
Canadian Jewish Congress and the Canadian Coalition of Jewish Women for the Get. The reform, as illustrated 
through article 21.1 of the Divorce Act, now provided the opportunity for either side to initiate proceedings and 
submit an affidavit to remove the barriers to religious remarriage. The reform was therefore aimed at protecting 
Jewish women who found themselves in a problematic divorce situation and ultimately help them toward obtaining 
a get (Jewish divorce). Although article 21.1 of the Divorce Act provides the opportunity for either side to initiate 
proceedings and submit an affidavit to remove the barriers to religious remarriage, this article does not prove to be 
helpful in our situation, since it would have been up to Mr. Marcovitz to submit the affidavit. 
110 At issue in this case is the interpretation of paragraph 12 of the Consent to Corollary Relief found in S.B.B. v. 
J.B.M., [2003] Q.J. No. 2896 (C.S.) (QL) [S.B.B.]: "The parties appear before the Rabbinical authorities in the City 
and District of Montreal for the purpose of obtaining the traditional religious Get, immediately upon a Decree Nisi 
of Divorce being granted." (hereinafter “the Consent”) 
111 Bruker, supra note 108, ¶ 4 (Abella J.). The status of agunah also affects any children borne out of a subsequent 
civil marriage. They would be considered illegitimate (mamzerim) under Jewish law and would only be able to 
marry similarly placed people: see Ibid, ¶ 4, 125. 
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religion under the Québec Charter had been breached. Seen as a civil obligation with religious 
undertones by the Superior Court112, compensation was awarded to the ex-wife, due to the long 
delays engendered by the husband’s refusal to give the get. Perceived as a religious obligation 
with civil undercurrents by the Court of Appeal113 – therefore not enforceable due to its nature as 
a moral obligation – the inferior decision was overturned, citing the principle of non-interference 
of the State in religious and private matters. Pitting religion against civil society obligations at the 
Supreme Court, Justice Abella (writing for the majority114) opined that “the invocation of 
freedom of religion does not, by itself, grant immunity from the need to weigh the assertion 
against competing values or harm.”115 This need for balance or reconciliation amongst 
fundamental rights is reflected, according to Abella J., in article 9.1 of the Québec Charter116. 
The majority of the Supreme Court found that a dispute with a religious aspect can be 
appropriately interpreted as justiciable117 as well as civilly viable118 and thus legally binding119. 
Justice Abella completed her analysis by noting that she did not believe that Mr. Marcovitz 
 
112 S.B.B., supra note 110. 
113 Marcovitz v. Bruker, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 55, No. 500-09-013353-032 (C.A.Q.) (QL) [Marcovitz] 
114 Justice Deschamps wrote a lengthly dissenting opinion (also on behalf of Charron J.), where they concluded that 
it would be inappropriate “to impose on them [courts] an additional burden of sanctioning religious precepts and 
undertakings.” (Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 102). According to Deschamps J., one must distinguish asking the courts 
from considering questions of a religious nature – as was done in Lafontaine, supra note 85 – and asking the courts 
to assess the impact of the respondent’s failure to consent to the get, therein creating a new recourse (Bruker, supra 
note 108, ¶ 124-125). Moreover, intervention in religious practices, according to Justice Deschamps, would defeat 
the point of adopting Amselem’s subjective standard of sincere belief (Bruker, supra, ¶ 131). Justice Deschamps 
concluded that the restraint shown by Canadian civil courts with regard to religious matters demonstrates the limits 
and maintains “a neutrality that is indispensable in a pluralistic and multicultural society.” (Bruker, supra, ¶ 181, 
184).  
115 Bruker, supra note 108, ¶ 73. Justice Abella articulated this point of view at the outset of her opinion as well and 
we believe it important to reproduce it in its entirety: “Canada rightly prides itself on its evolutionary tolerance for 
diversity and pluralism.  This journey has included a growing appreciation for multiculturalism, including the 
recognition that ethnic, religious or cultural differences will be acknowledged and respected.  Endorsed in legal 
instruments ranging from the statutory protections found in human rights codes to their constitutional enshrinement 
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the right to integrate into Canada’s mainstream based on and 
notwithstanding these differences has become a defining part of our national character. […] The right to have 
differences protected, however, does not mean that those differences are always hegemonic.  Not all differences are 
compatible with Canada’s fundamental values and, accordingly, not all barriers to their expression are arbitrary.  
Determining when the assertion of a right based on difference must yield to a more pressing public interest is a 
complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies bright-line application.  It is, at the same time, a delicate 
necessity for protecting the evolutionary integrity of both multiculturalism and public confidence in its importance.” 
(Ibid, ¶ 1-2) 
116 Québec Charter, supra note 38, art. 9.1: “In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall 
maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec.” 
See Bruker, supra note 108, ¶ 76-82. 
117 Bruker, supra note 108, ¶ 41-43, 47. 
118 Ibid, ¶ 51. 
119 Ibid, ¶ 62-64. 
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ights was indeed 
inconsequential .  
 
15 Charter rights130. Steel J.A., for a unanimous court, summarised their conclusions as follows: 
 
                                                
objected to giving the get to Ms. Bruker on religious grounds120, thereby questioning his sincerity. 
Moreover, when balanced with Ms. Bruker’s curtailed “ability to live her life fully as a Jewish 
woman in Canada”121, it was found that the breach of Mr. Marcovitz’s r
122
 
The right to freedom of religion was challenged lately in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of 
Child and Family Services)123, where a fourteen years old child objected to a blood transfusion on 
the basis of her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness. Considered as a ‘minor’ since under the 
age of sixteen by provincial child and family services legislation standards, the “best interest of 
the child” was determined according to State authorities124. Alternatively, if a child is over 
sixteen, no medical treatment could be ordered by the court, unless it is satisfied that the child 
lacks the ability to understand the consequences of the treatment125. Built into that legislation is 
an acknowledgement of a child’s capacity in the decision-making capacity over the age of sixteen. 
In the case at bar, A.C. refused a blood transfusion following internal bleeding due to Crohn’s 
disease after being admitted to a hospital. Months before this incident, A.C. had completed an 
“advance medical directive”, stating that she was not to receive a blood transfusion under any 
circumstance126. In the day following A.C.’s admission to the hospital, a psychiatric assessment 
was performed in order to determine A.C.’s “capacity to understanding death”127. Shortly after 
experiencing further internal bleeding, A.C.’s doctors wanted to give her a blood transfusion, but 
she once again refused, at which point she was apprehended as a ‘child in need of protection’ by 
the Director of Child and Family Services128. The motions judge granted the treatment order on 
two grounds: first, that there were no legislated restrictions of the authority to order medical 
treatment in the “best interest of the child” and second, that A.C. was in immediate medical 
danger129. The treatment order was appealed by A.C. and her parents, arguing on the one hand 
that section 25(8) of the CFSA should not have been applied to her and on the other, that sections 
25(8) and 25(9) of the CFSA were unconstitutional since they violated A.C.’s sections 2(a), 7 and
 
120 Ibid, ¶ 78-79. 
121 Ibid, ¶ 93. 
122 The majority did not discern any errors in the assessment of damages by the trial judge and therefore elected to 
leave them undisturbed: Bruker, ibid, ¶ 97-99. Given the minority position, damages would not have been awarded, 
since the issue of this case falls outside the jurisdiction of civil courts: Bruker, ibid, ¶ 177-180. 
123 A.C., supra note 75. 
124 Child and Family Services Act, C.C.S.M. c. C80, s. 25(8) [CFSA]. 
125 CFSA, supra note 124, s. 25(9). 
126 A.C., supra note 75, ¶ 6. 
127 Ibid, ¶ 6. 
128 Ibid, ¶ 7-8. 
129 Ibid, ¶ 12. A.C. received the blood transfusions a few hours later and the treatments were successful, leading to 
her full recovery; following this development, the Director of Child and Family Services withdrew its application: 
see Ibid, ¶ 13. 
130 Ibid, ¶ 14. 
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“While this section does represent an infringement of the child’s religious freedom 
under s. 2(a), such violation is saved by s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (the Charter).  Medical treatment against one’s wishes is also an infringement 
of one’s liberty and right to security under s. 7 of the Charter.  However, in this case, 
given the countervailing concerns of sanctity of life and protection of children, the 
infringement is not contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.  The state does have 
a continuing interest in the welfare of a child, even one with capacity.  Moreover, the 
infringement occurs in a procedurally fair manner.  While children are treated differently 
than adults, and children under 16 are treated differently than children 16 and over, this 
is not discriminatory as understood by s. 15 of the Charter.  Age-based distinctions are a 
common and necessary way of ordering society.  Analyzing these distinctions in a 
contextual manner, there is a valid correspondence between the differential treatment and 
the increased vulnerability and varying maturity of minors in a child protection 
situation.”131 
 
The interpretation of section 25(8) of the CFSA proved to be the only real source of 
disagreement between the majority opinion of the Supreme Court written by Justice Abella 
(writing for LeBel, Deschamps and Charron JJ. concurring) and the Manitoba Court of Appeal. 
Justice Abella argued that one should adopt a ‘sliding scale of scrutiny’132 rather than a strict one: 
in this way, place is made for the doctrine of the mature minor, while all the while addressing the 
best interests of the child133. According to the common law approach to medical treatment of 
 
131 Director of Child and Family Services v. A.C., 2007 MBCA 9 (CanLII), ¶ 4 [Director of Family Services]. 
132 A.C., supra note 75, ¶ 21-22. See esp. ¶ 23: “This interpretation of the “best interests” standard in s. 25(8) of the 
Act is not only more consistent with the actual developmental reality of young people; it is also conceptually 
consistent with the evolutionary development of the common law “mature minor” doctrine in both the Canadian and 
international jurisprudence.  Under this doctrine, courts have readily accepted that an adolescent’s treatment wishes 
should be granted a degree of deference that is reflective of his or her evolving maturity.  Notably, however, they 
have rarely viewed this mandate as being inconsistent with their overarching responsibility to protect children from 
harm.” 
133 Section 2(1) of the CFSA, supra note 124, sets out the “best interests of the child standard”. While this section of 
the Act has been modified since the hearing before the Court (A.C., supra note 75, ¶  32), I reproduce the Act as it 
was at the time of the hearing [emphasis in original]: 
 
2(1) The best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration of the director, an authority, the children’s 
advocate, an agency and a court in all proceedings under this Act affecting a child, other than proceedings to 
determine whether a child is in need of protection, and in determining the best interests of the child all relevant 
matters shall be considered, including  
  
(a)   the child’s opportunity to have a parent-child relationship as a wanted and needed member within a family 
structure;  
  
(b)   the mental, emotional, physical and educational needs of the child and the appropriate care or treatment, or 
both, to meet such needs; 
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minors, the doctrine of the mature minor should not be understood as “dictating guaranteed 
outcomes, particularly when the consequences for the young person are catastrophic”134, but 
rather “granting adolescents a degree of autonomy that is reflective of their evolving maturity”135. 
In this way, there is no “eureka moment”136 delineating the child from the adolescent, dividing 
between those who are in need of protection from harm from those who have the capacity to 
understand its effects137. The contrasting, if not to say conflicting, interpretations of A.C.’s right 
to freedom of religion provide ample terrain for discussion. Whereas Justice Abella argued that a 
commensurate approach allows for a proper balancing between interests138, she did not even 
proceed to an acknowledgment of the sincerity of A.C.’s belief. This did not go unnoticed by 
Chief Justice McLachlin (also writing for Rothstein J.)139 or Justice Binnie (dissenting)140, who 
both agreed that section 25(8) of the CFSA violated A.C.’s right to freedom of religion141. This is, 
however, where McLachlin C.J. and Binnie J. part ways, since the former opined that upon closer 
analysis, section 2(a) and 7 Charter claims merge: 
 
“Either the Charter requires that an ostensibly “mature” child under 16 
have an unfettered right to make all medical treatment decisions, or it does 
 
(c)   the child’s mental, emotional and physical stage of development;  
 
(d)   the child’s sense of continuity and need for permanency with the least possible disruption;  
  
(e)   the merits and the risks of any plan proposed by the agency that would be caring for the child compared with 
the merits and the risks of the child returning to or remaining within the family;  
  
(f)   the views and preferences of the child where they can reasonably be ascertained;  
  
(g)   the effect upon the child of any delay in the final disposition of the proceedings; and  
  
(h)   the child’s cultural, linguistic, racial and religious heritage. 
  
134 A.C., supra note 75, ¶ 69.  
135 Ibid. Abella J., at ¶ 96, offered a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be of assistance in the decision-making 
process, but cautioned that it should not become a formulaic response to all situations.   
136 Ibid, ¶ 4. 
137 This approach also permits the Supreme Court to hold that A.C.’s s. 7 and 15 Charter rights are not violated. 
With respect to her liberty and security of the person under s. 7, Abella J. noted that “[i]nterpreting the best interests 
standard so that a young person is afforded a degree of bodily autonomy and integrity commensurate with his or her 
maturity navigates the tension between an adolescent’s increasing entitlement to autonomy as he or she matures and 
society’s interest in ensuring that young people who are vulnerable are protected from harm. […] The balance is 
thus achieved between autonomy and protection, and the provisions are, accordingly, not arbitrary.” (A.C., supra, ¶ 
108) With regard to the claim of distinction based on age, the Court noted that the Manitoba Child and Family 
Services Act functions on the basis of maturity level rather than an age cut-off: see A.C., supra note 75, ¶ 111. 
138 A.C., supra note 75, ¶ 115. 
139 Ibid, ¶ 153. 
140 Ibid, ¶ 214. 
141 Ibid, ¶ 154 (McLachlin C.J.); ¶ 215 (Binnie J.) 
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not, regardless of the individual child’s motivation for refusing treatment. 
The fact that A.C.’s aversion to receiving a blood transfusion springs from 
religious conviction does not change the essential nature of the claim as one 
for absolute personal autonomy in medical decision-making.”142 
 
Given this either/or approach and by demonstrating that the objective of the legislation 
remains sound, McLachlin C.J. explained that the limit on religious practices emerges as justified 
under section 1 of the Charter143.  
 
Unlike the majority opinions, Justice Binnie argued that the crux of the dispute lay in the 
fact that the presumption of incapacity contained in section 25 CFSA remained irrebutable144. 
Therefore, beyond the violation of section 2(a) and 7 of the Charter, the CFSA was conceptually 
closed to A.C. being considered a “mature minor”145. Amongst the divergent and convergent 
layers of analysis and levels of discontent, we see that A.C. has emerged from the hands of the 
Supreme Court as a “wait-and-see” approach. Although a commensurate approach is logical and 
the proposal of a compendium of factors furthers our understanding of how to evaluate a child’s 
maturity, it does not sufficiently explain how one is to treat a child’s religious wishes when 
confronted with serious issues, such as medical conditions146.  
 
 
142 A.C., supra note 75, ¶ 155 [my emphasis]. 
143 Ibid, ¶ 156. McLachlin C.J. goes on to note, in the same paragraph, that given the sound objective of the CFSA – 
namely to ensure the health and safety of vulnerable people – the CFSA cannot be considered arbitrary for the 
purposes of s. 7 of the Charter.  
144 Ibid, ¶ 225, 231. 
145 Ibid, ¶ 224. 
146 In considering the spiritual and physical consequences of choices, Professor Shauna Van Praagh wrote an opinion 
piece following A.C., supra note 75, where she suggested that one might find a fuller picture of teenage turbulence 
and personal autonomy by looking at the fictional world of Harry Potter, where she concluded that “All of us, 
including the Supreme Court, may want to stand in line for a movie ticket.”: Shauna Van Praagh, “Harry Potter and 
the real story of A.C.”, Globe and Mail (July 15th 2009), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/harry-
potter-and-the-real-story-of-ac/article1218335/ (site last accessed 30.07.2009. On this subject, see also Shauna Van 
Praagh, “Adolescence, autonomy and Harry Potter: the child as the decision-maker” (2005) 1(4) Int’l J.L.C. 335, at 
369 [Van Praagh, “Adolescence, Autonomy and Harry Potter”], who suggested that “the law of civil wrongs 
concerns itself both with recognising the agency of the individual and with protecting that individual’s interests. 
Replacing ‘individual’ with ‘young person’ challenges us to examine more closely the promise of both recognition 
and protection.” Christopher Bird put the question more directly when commenting A.C., supra note 75: “[t]he 
pressing question in A.C. is not specifically the constitutionality of the sections of the Child and Family Services 
Act; that question is a legal hobbyhorse for the real issue at stake in the case, which was “where do we draw the line 
when a child in a religious family wishes to essentially commit suicide by refusing treatment?””: see Christopher 
Bird, “A.C. v. Manitoba: Saving Pressing Questions for Later”, The Court,  http://www.thecourt.ca/2009/07/10/ac-
v-manitoba-saving-pressing-questions-for-later/ (site last accessed 30.07.2009. Posing the question in this manner, I 
consider that freedom of conscience becomes more relevant as well as the family’s role as a locus of indoctrination. 
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A relatively clear-cut case of freedom of religion that took an unexpected turn was brought 
before the Supreme Court in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony147. New regulations 
regarding drivers’ licenses148 were instituted by the Alberta government, upsetting a careful 
balance that had existed with the Hutterian Colony for the last thirty years149. More specifically, 
all drivers’ licenses were to be issued with photographs. The Hutterian Brethren believed that 
graven images, such as those obtained by the process of photography, would contravene the 
Second commandment150. Whereas the Albertan government had issued these new regulations in 
an effort to heighten highway safety as well as reduce identity theft, the Hutterian Brethren argued 
that these ‘willing images’ would violate their right to freedom of religion. An impasse was 
reached after additional measures proposed151 by the government to alleviate the infringement on 
their right to freedom of religion were rejected, as was the Hutterian Brethren’s counter-
suggestion of a non-photo driver’s license marked “not for identification purposes”. Adjudication 
ensued on “the basis that the universal photo requirement constitute[d] a limit on the freedom of 
religion of Colony members who wish to obtain a driver’s licence and thus infringe[d] section 
2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”152.  
 
Whereas both lower courts ruled in favour of the Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony153 
and despite the Albertan government’s admission of its infringement of their rights, the majority 
of the Supreme Court (Abella, LeBel and Fish JJ. dissenting) found that “the Charter guarantees 
 
147 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69. 
148 Operator Licensing and Vehicle Control Regulation, Alta. Reg. 320/2002, s. 14(1)(b) (am. Alta. Reg. 137/2003, 
s. 3. 
149 The Hutterian Brethren had benefited from an exemption, obtaining a Code G license, which was a non-photo 
license and could be obtained at the discretion of the Registrar for religious objectors. 
150 “You shall not make for yourself an idol, or any likeness of what is in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in 
the water under the earth” (Exodus 20:4): Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 29. 
151 More specifically, the government of Alberta proposed the following measures: “first, that they have their 
photograph taken and printed on their licences.  Each licence would then be placed in a special package which the 
licensee would never be required to open, preventing the licensee from ever coming into physical contact with the 
printed photo.  The photographs would be stored in digital form in the database.  The second proposal was that a 
photograph would be taken but not actually printed on their licences.  Only the digital images would be stored in the 
facial recognition database.” (Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 122 (Abella J., diss.)). See also 
Ibid, ¶ 12 (McLachlin C.J.). 
152 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 3 (McLachlin C.J., for majority). We note that the 
Hutterites argued that the new regulations discriminated on the basis of religion and thus invoked a second argument 
based on s. 15 of the Charter. This claim was dismissed by McLachlin C.J. (at ¶ 108) and was not addressed in the 
minority opinions. 
153 See Hutterian Brethern of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, 2006 ABQB 338 (CanLII), Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony v. Alberta, 2007 ABCA 160 (CanLII). Slatter J.A. would have allowed the appeal, since further 
accommodations by the province, according to him, “would require it to significantly compromise a central feature 
of the security of the licensing system, and would amount to undue hardship.” (Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony 
v. Alberta, 2007 ABCA 160 (CanLII), ¶ 124). 
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freedom of religion, but does not indemnify practitioners against all costs incident to the practice 
of religion.”154  
 
Although the sincerity of the Hutterites’ belief was not challenged155 and its nexus with 
religion had been conceded by the province, the weight of the incurred burden was contentious, 
since this point had not been admitted by the province. According to McLachlin C.J. (writing for 
Binnie, Deschamps and Rothstein JJ), the lower courts seemed to have proceeded on the 
assumption that the universal photo requirement constituted a burden “capable of interfering with 
the religious belief or practice” and continued by examining whether this burden constituted a 
reasonable limit.156. Moreover, it was acknowledged by McLachlin C.J. that freedom of religion 
can pose a particular challenge to the universality of many regulatory programs157. In this way, 
rights must be balanced and limits justified within a free and democratic society: this is the 
purpose of the Oakes’ test. The province’s primary objective was to ensure traffic safety; identity 
theft was seen as a collateral problem to the existing traffic safety system158. This interpretation 
was thus considered a ‘measure prescribed by law’ and constituted a substantial and pressing 
objective159, according to the majority. The rational connexion between the universal photo 
requirement and the goal of protecting the integrity of the driver’s licensing system was 
established as well as preventing it from being used for the purposes of identity theft160. Indeed, 
while the objective and rational connexion of the regulation were generally accepted, the 
condition of minimal impairment proved to be decisive as well as divisive for the Supreme Court. 
Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that the measure presented by the Albertan government 
proved to be the least intrusive given the goal of maintaining the integrity of the driver’s licensing 
system161. While debates and litigation about freedom of religion often prove to be multifaceted 
as well as laden, I believe that it was essential for McLachlin C.J. to have clarified the uses and 
misuses of the Oakes’ test and that of the analysis of reasonable accommodation as a result of the 
approach used by the lower courts162. As such, she held that:   
 
 
154 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 95. 
155 Ibid, ¶ 7, 33. 
156 Ibid, ¶ 34 citing Edwards Books, supra note 47, at 759. 
157 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 36. McLachlin C.J. also explained that regulations are the 
“life blood” of the administrative state and do not imperil the rule of law. One should therefore not distinguish 
between law and regulation in this case: Ibid, ¶ 41. McLachlin C.J. also explains that freedom of religion cases, such 
as this one, often present an “all or nothing dilemma”: see Ibid, ¶ 61. 
158 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 45. 
159 Ibid, ¶ 47. 
160 Ibid, ¶ 52. 
161 Ibid, ¶ 63. McLachlin C.J. rejects Abella J.’s casting of the situation, noting that the risk should be evaluated not 
on the basis of the comparison of a “few religious dissenters” versus over 700 000 unlicensed Albertans, but rather 
whether permitting any exceptions pose a real risk to the integrity of the licensing system: see Ibid, ¶ 63, 64.  
162 Ibid, ¶ 65.  
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“where the validity of a law of general application is at stake, reasonable 
accommodation is not an appropriate substitute for a proper s. 1 analysis 
based on the methodology of Oakes. Where the government has passed a 
measure into law, the provisions of s. 1 apply. The government is entitled to 
justify the law, not by showing that it has accommodated the claimant, but 
by establishing that the measure is rationally connected to a pressing and 
substantial goal, minimally impairing of the right and proportionate in its 
effects.”163 
 
This represents a significant divergence from the result in British Columbia (Public 
Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU164, insofar as a difference is established 
between legislative and general standards.  
 
In the final step of balancing the salutary and deleterious effects, McLachlin C.J. 
distinguished speculative risk from real risk as well as the impact in terms of Charter values. 
Although the risk cannot be qualified as “definite”, McLachlin C.J. argued that waiting for “proof 
positive” would decrease the number of laws passed as well as make public interest suffer165. 
However, in saying that one cannot wait for “proof positive”, McLachlin C.J. is herself 
speculating on the certainty of the risk. It is difficult to comprehend how this could constitute a 
firm argument, when the risk remains physically unquantifiable. In examining the deleterious 
effects of such legislation, McLachlin C.J. admitted that there is no “magic barometer” to measure 
the implication of a particular limit on a religious practice: “[r]eligion is a matter of faith, 
intermingled with culture.”166 Just as one must distinguish between speculative and real risk, one 
must also discern between incidental effects and meaningful choices to one’s religious practice: 
according to the majority of the Supreme Court and based on the evidence submitted, the 
Hutterian claimants were not deprived of this capacity167.  Although it was acknowledged that the 
 
163 Ibid, ¶ 71 [my emphasis]. 
164 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 [Meiorin]. 
McLachlin C.J., for the Court, found that not only the Government’s aerobic standard was prima facie 
discriminatory but also that the Government’s standard did not establish that it was a bona fide occupational 
requirement (BFOR). Whereas the onus was on the government to prove that it was a BFOR previously, it now only 
has to establish that the measure meet the s. 1 Charter test, namely a rational goal, minimal impairment and 
proportionality. The onus of demonstrating a “legislatively embedded” accommodation is therefore removed from 
the government, creating an alternate interpretation of responsibility.  
165 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 85.  
166 Ibid, ¶ 89, 90. 
167 Ibid, ¶ 94-96. At ¶ 97, McLachlin C.J. noted that the claimants’ affidavit does not explain why they can devise or 
obtain alternate transport. In her view, there is no evidence that this alternative would be prohibitive. Moreover, at ¶ 
98, it is noted that driving automobiles on highways is not a right but a privilege; this point is contested by Abella J. 
at ¶ 171, who argued that the majority’s approach was at the same time novel and inconsistent with the principle 
enunciated in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.  
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universal photo requirement curtailed the claimants’ right to freedom of religion, the majority of 
the Supreme Court concluded that limit imposed was justified under section 1 of the Charter168.  
 
Justice Abella’s dissenting opinion has provided the reader with certain facets that deserve 
particular attention when balancing majority and minority rights. While it has already been 
acknowledged that the majority and minority opinions parted ways on the condition of minimal 
impairment169, I believe that Justice Abella’s use of freedom of religion case law from the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) proved to be at the same time “novel and 
inconsistent”, to borrow her own words170 and dangerous, to add my own171. Indeed, there are 
unmistakable similarities between the constitutional systems, such as the existence of a 
comparable principle of proportionality, as well as similar rights to freedom of religion. 
Nevertheless, one must be aware of the inherent differences between national and supranational 
constitutional systems of law as well as the context from which these cases emerge. Despite her 
relatively short tenure thus far at the Supreme Court, Justice Abella has emerged as a 
conscientious interpreter of tensions involved in claims of freedom of religion172 and although 
this case does not break pattern, the justifications employed are contentious, to say the least. 
Abella J. began her opinion by contrasting the necessary balance that must occur between the 
benefits sought and the harm imposed by new measures and the fate of minorities living in a 
 
168 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 104. The s. 15 Charter claim was not treated at any length 
by the majority and the universal photo requirement was justified as follows at ¶ 108: “Assuming the respondents 
could show that the regulation creates a distinction on the enumerated ground of religion, it arises not from any 
demeaning stereotype but from a neutral and rationally defensible policy choice.” The s. 15 Charter claim in A.C. 
was similarly dismissed: see A.C., supra note 75, ¶ 111. 
169 A.C., supra note 75, ¶ 143 (Abella J.). 
170 Ibid, ¶ 171 (Abella J.). To my knowledge, this also constituted the first time that ECtHR case law was used for 
freedom of religion. 
171 Given the European Court of Human Rights’ most recent ruling on freedom of religion, which included an 
unprecedented discussion on that topic, it seems as though the ECtHR is turning a page and proceeding to a more 
sensitive analysis of freedom of religion. While no decisions have been rendered by the Supreme Court on this topic 
since its release, it will be interesting to see how (or if) it handles the ECtHR’s nascent ouverture on religion, and 
religious difference. One cannot lose sight of the fact that Lautsi c. Italie, decision of 3 November 2009, App. No. 
30814/06 [Lautsi], took place in the very particular context of public schools, and thus public institutions, 
compounded by the vulnerability of children. The ECtHR was “unable to grasp how the display, in classrooms in 
State schools, of a symbol that could reasonably be associated with Catholicism (the majority religion in Italy) could 
serve the educational pluralism that was essential to the preservation of a “democratic society” as that was conceived 
by the Convention, a pluralism that was recognised by the Italian Constitutional Court.”: see Lautsi, ¶ 56-57 and 
European Court of Human Rights, Press Release Issued by the Registrar of the Chamber judgment in Lautsi c. Italie, 
“Crucifix in Classrooms: Contrary to Parents’ Right to Educate their Children in Line with Their Convictions and 
To Children’s Right to Freedom of Religion”, online: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=857732&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydo
cnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (site last accessed 25.11.2009) 
172 See, for example: Bruker, supra note 108; A.C., supra note 75. I note that Justice Abella did not engage in an 
examination of the sincerity of A.C.’s beliefs, however: see A.C., supra note 75, ¶ 153. 
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world of majority law173. In her view, the absence of an exemption to the universal photo 
requirement proved to be dramatic174 for the Hutterian colony members, both in terms of 
ramifications on our multicultural society, as well as curtailing the autonomous nature of certain 
religious comm
 
Freedom of religion, according to Justice Abella, should be understood as not only 
personal rights, but also as forming a collective conscience of ‘permissible beliefs’; these values 
were emphasised in Big M Drug Mart as well as Edwards Books175. Justice Abella goes on to say 
that the ECtHR has espoused a similar liberal conception of freedom of religion in Kokkinakis176 
and Şahin177. I cannot adopt that view, however, for two reasons. Firstly, freedom of religion was 
 
173 Abella J. quotes a passage from author Martha C. Nussbaum’s Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s 
Tradition of Religious Equality (New York, Basic Books, 2008) at ¶ 110, but does not share the entire sentence, 
which betrays, in my view, Abella J.’s actual opinion of the harm to the constitutional rights of the Hutterians. I 
believe it is therefore important to reproduce the sentence in full: “Some such burdens to religion may have to be 
borne, if the peace and safety of the state are really at stake, or if there is some other extremely strong state interest. 
But it seems deeply wrong for the state to put citizens in such a tragic position needlessly, or in matters of less 
weight. And often matters lying behind laws of general applicability are not so weighty; sometimes they come 
down to the mere desire for homogeneity and an unexamined reluctance to delve into the details of a little 
known or unpopular religion.”: M.C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of 
Religious Equality (New York, Basic Books, 2008), p. 117 [my emphasis] 
174 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 114 (Abella J.) [my emphasis]. 
175 Ibid, ¶ 127 (Abella J.), citing Big M Drug Mart, supra note 36, at 759 and Edwards Books, supra note 47 at 346. 
176 Kokkinakis v. Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260-A [Kokkinakis]. 
177 Consider, most recently, Şahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, ECHR 2005-XI [Şahin], ¶ 109, where the Court was 
faced with the issue of students wearing headscarves in universities in Turkey. The Court recognised that the role of 
the national decision making body must be given special importance when opinions differ widely on the relationship 
between the state and religion in a democratic society. Domestic differences are determinate in such cases. Author 
Howard Gilbert, in a case comment on Şahin argued that the ECtHR should clearly identify the extent to which it 
has overruled past jurisprudence. First, the Court must articulate what beliefs held by an individual fall within the 
scope of Art. 9(1). […] The second area of development concerns the relationship between the belief and its 
manifestation. […] The third area of development, which the Court has begun to articulate, is under what 
circumstances is the State justified in restricting manifestations of belief?”, see Howard Gilbert, “Case Comment. 
Redefining Manifestation of Belief in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey” (2006) Eur. H.R.L. Rev. 308, 326. On the other hand, 
author Lech Garlicki has observed recently that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on freedom on religion has developed 
into an “organized system of precedents” and submitted that freedom of religion must be afforded a wider margin of 
appreciation according to national differences: see Lech Garlicki, “Collective Aspects of the Religious Freedoms: 
Recent Developments in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights” in András Sajó, ed., Censorial 
Sensitivities: Free Speech and Religion in a Fundamentalist World (Utretch, Eleven International Publishing, 2008), 
217 at 230-232. Finally author Nicholas Hatzis recently decried Kokkinakis as being an “elliptical judgment” that 
leaves the reader with more questions than answers: see Nicholas Hatzis, “Neutrality, Proselytism, and Religious 
Minorities at the European Court of Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court” (2009) 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. Online 
120, 122. The recent decisions of Dogru c. France, App. No. 27058/05, decision of December 12 2008 [Drogu] and 
Kervanci v. France, App. No. 31645/04, decision of December 12 2008 (def. decision on March 4 2009) [Kervanci] 
also found that the right to freedom of religion had not been violated by the State. At issue was the claimants’ 
exclusion from their school, following their refusal to remove their veil during physical education classes. In both 
cases, the Court unanimously found that the claimants’ right to freedom of religion, as protected under art. 9 ECHR, 
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only examined in a substantive manner by the ECtHR for the first time some fifty years after the 
enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR). As a point of 
comparison, Big M Drug Mart was released three years following the enactment of the Charter; 
since then, the case law on freedom of religion has developed greatly. In this way, it seems as 
though one might be moving at two different speeds and discrediting progress and discussion in 
Canada. Second, the definitions of freedom of religion set forward in the aforementioned cases 
are done without consideration to context. At issue in Kokkinakis was the criminal prosecution of 
a Jehovah’s Witness for proselytising; at issue in Şahin was the prohibition of students wearing 
headscarves in universities in Turkey. Whereas the former dealt with the clash of a minority 
religious group with the ‘recognised dominant religion’178, the later dealt with the collision 
between the manifestation of religious beliefs and the established secular (laik) State179. In both 
cases, the national constitution entrenched the relationship with the State with regards to religion; 
in both cases, the European Convention on Human Rights was found to be at odds with the 
established national regimes. The foundation of a “democratic society” was employed by the 
ECtHR to demonstrate a breach in M. Kokkinakis’ rights as well as defend national policies in 
Şahin. These ‘liberal conceptions’ of freedom of religion espoused by the ECtHR must be 
understood as the other side of the rights pendulum, often used to accord deference to national 
orders rather than defences to particular claimants through the doctrine of the “national margin of 
appreciation”. While comparative law in general and the recognition of pluralistic societies in 
particular has served the Supreme Court of Canada well, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
differing motivations of the States and individuals.  
 
Although the emphasis on the individual’s subjective conception of freedom of religion 
has been clearly resounding since Amselem, the implication of profoundly communitarian 
interests, as experienced by the Hutterites, has been emphasised of late by Abella J.. In this 
manner, her appreciation of both individual and collective aspects of religion is welcomed, since 
religion is not only about performed rites and individual beliefs, but also the interface with the 
greater community.  
 
The use of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova180 to illustrate the 
communitarian appeal of religion should be mitigated, however, since the respective State 
objectives differ greatly, as do their consequences. At issue in this case was Moldova’s refusal to 
recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia; the State’s refusal, it was argued, constituted an 
 
as well as under art. 2 of the First Protocol, had not been violated. The Court found, as related in Kervanci, that the 
restriction to the rights of the claimants to manifest their religious convictions was justified given the imperatives of 
laïcité in the shared space of schools: see Kervanci, supra, ¶ 17. 
178 Article 3 of the 1975 Constitution (Greece).  
179 Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution (Turkey). For an enlightening discussion on the re-invention of secularism in 
Turkey, see Amélie Barras, “A rights-based discourse to contest the boundaries of state secularism? The case of the 
headscarf bans in France and Turkey” (2009) 16(6) Democratization 1237.  
180 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, ECHR 2001-XII [Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia] 
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infringement to their right of freedom of religion (article 9 ECHR) and amounted to 
discrimination on the grounds of religion (article 14 ECHR). By not proceeding to its recognition, 
the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia remained without rights under the Religious 
Denominations Act181, and this, despite the fact that freedom of religion (without regard to 
denomination) was recognised in Article 31 of the Moldovan Constitution of 1994182. The 
government argued that the case concerned an ecclesiastical conflict and that any recognition of 
the Metropolitan Church of Bessabaria would provoke conflict within the Orthodox Church183. 
Before the ECtHR, while it was agreed that public order could constitute a legitimate aim, it must 
remain proportional. The State’s outright refusal of recognition the Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia could not be considered proportionate184. While Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia 
rightly illustrated that not all State objectives are created equal, it remains clear that further 
attention needs to be placed on context. As previously stated, it is important to recognise the 
individual as well as collective components of religion185. Nevertheless, I believe it imprudent to 
employ the conclusions on freedom of religion in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia in 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony without closer attention to the facts that gave rise to the 
case. The costs of not recognising a church or religion by the authorities cannot be equated with 
the consequences of a universal photo requirement for drivers’ licenses. First, by refusing to 
recognise a particular group, such as the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, their legal voice and 
powers of representation are rendered nil before the State institutions. By enforcing a universal 
 
181 Religious Denominations Act, (Law no. 979-XII of 24 March 1992) as cited in Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia, supra note 180, ¶ 13. The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia could therefore not operate or practice as 
a church: see Ibid, ¶ 104-105. 
182 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, supra, ¶ 89. 
183 Ibid, ¶ 23, 98. Moldova had achieved independence only in 1991 and the government argued that one factor 
conducive to stability was religion, since the majority of Moldovans were of Greek Orthodox faith (Ibid, ¶ 111); this 
reasoning did not, however, stop the government from recognising other religions, however: see ibid, ¶ 30. The 
Moldovan Court of Appeal dismissed the State’s arguments, noting that the term denomination should not be 
restricted to the meanings of Catholicism or Orthodoxy and therefore constituted an unfounded breach to the right of 
freedom of religion: see Ibid, ¶ 24. 
184 Ibid, ¶ 130. The Court noted at ¶ 118-119 that while a certain margin of appreciation is left to the member states 
by the ECHR, it should not go unchecked. In this sense, by refusing to recognise the Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia, the State contravened other rights, such as the right of association and the right to a fair trial. Moreover, 
the ECtHR noted that the arguments related to discrimination on the basis of religion amounted to a repetition of the 
freedom of religion claim and there was no need to examine them separately: see Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia, supra note 180, ¶ 134. Lebel J. explained that both the ECHR and the Oakes’ test belong to Thomas 
Aquinas’ philosophical tradition, namely that proportionate burdens should be imposed on citizens: see Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 184.  
185 Perhaps LeBel J., in his dissent, framed the issue as well as the context in a more comprehensive fashion, since 
according to him, “[t]hat decision reflects the complex and highly textured nature of freedom of religion. […] 
Religion is about religious beliefs, but also about religious relationships. The present appeal signals the importance 
of this aspect. It raises issues about belief, but also about the maintenance of communities of faith. We are 
discussing the fate not only of a group of farmers, but of a community that shares a common faith and a way of life 
that is viewed by its members as a way of living that faith and of passing it on to future generations.” See Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 181-182. 
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photo requirement, the State may be seen as curtailing certain habits, but is not impeding their 
legal voice. Second, by refusing to legally recognise the existence of a particular group, such as 
the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, a perception or aura of illegitimacy cloaks the group. By 
enforcing a universal photo requirement, the civil rights of the Hutterites’ remain intact, though 
perhaps a little bruised. Indeed, Justice Abella was right to point out that the Hutterites rely on 
their self-sufficiency and that aspect must be taken into account when understanding the 
consequences of one’s free choice and personal autonomy186. In conclusion, Abella J. (Lebel and 
Fish JJ. agreeing) would have dismissed the appeal, but suspend a declaration of invalidity for one 
year in order to give the Albertan government an opportunity to fashion a responsive 
amendment187. While this case considered the right to freedom of religion in particular, it 
demonstrated that more attention should be heeded to the rights of particular groups and their 
relationship with the State. 
 
Justice LeBel’s reference to freedom of religion as “highly textured”188 in Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony eloquently illustrates the complexity in handling such a fundamental 
freedom in the Charter era. The texture of freedom of religion – if one can use such a term – can 
differ according to the feel, surface, quality, consistency and grain. In examining sincere 
individual beliefs to profoundly communitarian interests of religion, a subtle shift in paradigm can 
be observed. Whereas Amselem defined both religion and sincere beliefs, the focus has shifted to 
the impact of competing beliefs, veiled under the discourse on Charter values189. Thus, the 
reluctant juncture between the subjective functional and substantive content approaches is 
acknowledged when defining religion in law in Canadian constitutional setting. The consequences 
of such a conjunction will be discussed further on in the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186 See Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 165, where Hofer v. Hofer, [1970] S.C.R. 958 [Hofer] 
illustrated the community’s self-sufficiency. 
187 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra, ¶ 177. 
188 Ibid, ¶ 181. 
189 On the rise of “Charter values” and their significance, see Mark Antaki, “The Turn to “Values” in Canadian 
Constitutional Law” in Luc B. Tremblay and Grégoire C. Webber, eds., La limitation des droits de la Charte: essais 
critiques sur l’arrêt R. c. Oakes/The Limitation of Charter Rights: Critical Essays on R. v. Oakes (Montréal, 
Éditions Thémis, 2009), 155-181. The author observes at pages 180-181 that in order “[t]o better grasp the 
significance of “values” as our ethical keyword, then, we must inquire into the significance of our having become 
“subjects” – as individuals, groups, societies, even as humanity – and of all beings (including ourselves) having 
become “objects”. […] Changing our “values” may not be much more than a first step in achieving some clarity 
about our world and ourselves, including how we live a life in, or of, the law.”  
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1.4 Violation of Freedom of Religion: The Duty to Reasonably Accommodate 
Religion and Proportionality under the Oakes’ Test 
 
As seen previously in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony190, claims of freedom of 
religion can be treated in one of two ways, depending on whether it is the validity of the law that 
is at stake or that of a government action or administrative practice. While the former employs the 
section 1 justification analysis better known as the Oakes’ test, the latter draws on the doctrine of 
reasonable accommodation. The remedies also vary, according to the path chosen: if the law is 
found to be unconstitutional, remedy lies under section 52 of the Charter whereas if the 
government action or administrative practice violates Charter rights, the remedy is found under 
section 24(1) of the Charter191. With these distinctions in mind, I will proceed to a short overview 
of reasonable accommodation (1.4.1) and revisit proportionality under the Oakes’ test (1.4.2.). 
 
 
1.4.1 The Duty to Reasonably Accommodate Religion 
 
1.4.1.1 The Case Law of Reasonable Accommodation 
 
Much has been written on the subject of reasonable accommodation of religion in the last ten 
years192 and even more so since the Bouchard-Taylor Report in Québec in 2007193. Reasonable 
accommodation should remain, however, a legal obligation rather than a political tool to address 
 
190 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 66-67. McLachlin C.J. also adds, at ¶ 68-69, that minimal 
impairment and reasonable accommodation are conceptually distinct, since the former deals with laws of general 
application and the latter must tailor their relationships by respecting the existing human rights’ legislation.  
191 Ibid, ¶ 66-67.   
192 See, for example: Woehrling, « L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable », supra note 48; Christian Brunelle, 
Discrimination et obligation d’accommodement raisonnable en milieu de travail syndiqué (Cowansville, Éditions 
Yvon Blais, 2001); Myriam Jézéquel, ed., La justice à l’épreuve de la diversité culturelle (Cowansville, Éditions 
Yvon Blais, 2006). 
193 See, for example: Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, « Quelques angles morts du débat sur l’accommodement 
raisonnable à la lumière de la question du port de signes religieux à l’école publique : réflexions en forme de points 
d’interrogation » in Myriam Jézéquel, ed., Les accommodements raisonnables : quoi, comment, jusqu’où? 
(Montréal, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007), 241-286 [Gaudreault-DesBiens, «Quelques angles morts »] ; Stéphane 
Bernatchez, « Les enjeux juridiques du débat québécois sur les accommodements raisonnables », (2007) 38 R.D.U.S. 
233 [Bernatchez, « Enjeux juridiques »]; Bosset & Eid, « Droit et religion », supra note 48; José Woehrling, «  La 
place de la religion à l’école publique » (2007) 41 R.J.T. 651 [Woehrling, « Religion à l’école »]; Sébastien 
Grammond, « Conceptions canadienne et québécoise des droits fondamentaux et de la religion : convergence ou 
conflit? » (2009) 43 R.J.T. 83 [Grammond, « Conceptions canadienne et québécoise»]; Jean-François 
Gaudreault-Desbiens, ed., Le droit, la religion et le « raisonnable » (Montréal, Les Éditions Thémis, 2009); Paul 
Eid, Pierre Bosset, Micheline Milot and Sébastien Lebel-Grenier, eds., Appartenances religieuses, appartenance 
citoyenne : un équilibre en tension (Québec, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2009). 
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public opinion194. The objective here is not to provide an in depth-analysis of the reasonable 
accommodation of religion, but rather a synopsis of relevant principles as applied under the 
Charter era.  
 
In its earliest inception, reasonable accommodation sought to find balance with the rights of 
others in order to preserve a society’s social structure195; it was not (and is not) seen as an 
absolute right. While first utilised to counter discriminatory practices found in employer-
employee relations, the framework of reasonable accommodation has since been expanded into 
other areas of civil rights. Reasonable accommodation, therefore, was defined by the Supreme 
Court in O’Malley as : 
 
“[t]he duty in a case of adverse effect discrimination on the basis of religion or 
creed is to take reasonable steps to accommodate the complainant, short of 
undue hardship: in other words, to take such steps as may be reasonable to 
accommodate without undue interference in the operation of the employer's 
business and without undue expense to the employer.”196 
 
An ultimate aspect of undue hardship was developed later in Central Okanagan School 
District No. 23 v. Renaud197 and Commission scolaire de Chambly v. Bergevin198, as noted by 
Bosset and Eid199, whereby the duty to accommodate one employee should not come at the 
expense of another employee’s rights, nor should it affect their morale. The Supreme Court, when 
faced with a collision between an employer’s requirements and an employee’s religious beliefs, 
explained that “bona fide occupational qualification and bona fide occupational requirement are 
equivalent and co-extensive terms.”200 Nevertheless, reasonable accommodation has been employed 
beyond the realm of bona fide occupational requirements since British Columbia (Public Service 
Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU201 and British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor 
                                                 
194 On that subject, see Pauline Côté, “Québec and Reasonable Accommodation: Uses and Misuses of Public 
Consultation” in Lori G. Beaman and Peter Beyer, eds., Religion and Diversity in Canada (Leiden, Koninklijke Brill 
NV, 2008), 41-65. 
195 Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, ¶ 22 [O’Malley]. 
196 O’Malley, supra note 195, ¶ 23. 
197 Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 [Central Okanagan School District]. 
198 Commission scolaire de Chambly v. Bergevin, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525 [Bergevin]. 
199 Bosset & Eid, « Droit et religion », supra note 48, ¶ 13. 
200 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489 [emphasis in original] 
[Alberta Dairy Pool]. This approach effectively overruled Bhinder v. C.N.R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561 [Bhinder], where 
the majority of the Supreme Court distinguished O’Malley from Bhinder, since the latter was concerned by the 
presence of s. 14(a) in the Canadian Human Rights Act (which explicitly created a bona fide occupational requirement 
defence) whereas the former was governed by provisions of the Ontario Human Rights Code: see Bhinder, ¶ 41. 
201 Meiorin, supra note 164, as cited in Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 
[Multani], at ¶ 130. 
37 
 
Lex Electronica, vol. 15 n°2 (Automne/Autumn 2010) 
 
Droits d’auteur et droits de reproduction. Toutes les demandes de reproduction doivent être 
acheminées à Copibec (reproduction papier) – (514) 288-1664 – 1(800) 717-2022. 
licences@copibec.qc.ca 
 
                                                
Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights)202, thus extending the duty to 
accommodate to all persons governed by human rights legislation.  Meorin  also signalled the end of 
a lengthy controversy between doctrine and jurisprudence, according to Woehrling, on the question 
of whether reasonable accommodation should extend to both direct and indirect discrimination203. 
Hence, certain conditions must be met in order to obtain an accommodation on the basis of freedom 
of religion, according to Woehrling: first, they must be substantive moral or religious convictions; 
second, not only must these religious convictions exist, they must also be sincere; finally, the 
claimant must demonstrate that the restriction on his or her freedom of religion is serious204. 
 
The minority of the Supreme Court in Amselem opined that the duty of reasonable 
accommodation could not be imported to rights other than equality rights. Unlike Aubry v. Éditions 
Vice-Versa inc.205 and Prud’homme v. Prud’homme206, where two fundamental freedoms were 
balanced under the proviso of section 9.1 of the Québec Charter207, the minority in Amselem held it 
inapplicable due to the impossible balancing of rights and further complicated by the subjective 
nature of the test at hand208. While Stéphane Bernatchez treated this point as an unresolved question, 
which is disputed by some209, I have elected to address it under the lens of case-law since it 
represents a question mark in the evolution of the duty to reasonably accommodate.   
 
More recently, the distinction between reasonable accommodation and minimal impairment 
has wavered, as seen in Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys210. At issue was 
whether an orthodox Sikh boy could be allowed to wear his kirpan to school, which was in 
conformity with his religious beliefs but in seeming contradiction with the school board’s code of 
conduct. While essentially an administrative law decision, Multani was re-framed as a case of 
religious freedom rather than one base on the validity of an administrative decision. Although the 
majority observed the correspondence between the concepts of reasonable accommodation and 
 
202 British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 
3 S.C.R. 868 [Grismer], as cited in Multani, supra note 201, at ¶ 130. 
203 See Meiorin, supra note 164, at 32 as cited by Woehrling, « Religion à l’école », supra note 193, 668 and 
footnote 33. 
204 Woehrling, «L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable », supra note 48, 384-398.  
205 Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa inc., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591 [Aubry]. 
206 Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 663 [Prud’homme]. 
207 Québec Charter, supra note 38, art. 9.1: “In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall 
maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec.  
In this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed by law.” 
208 Amselem, supra note 84, ¶ 154, citing Devine v. Québec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790, 818 [Devine]. 
209 See Bernatchez, « Enjeux juridiques », supra note 193, ¶ 37-38. According to Bernatchez, authors José 
Woehrling and Christian Brunelle maintain instead that an infringement of the right to freedom of religion could 
create a duty of reasonable accommodation: see Christian Brunelle, « La sécurité et l’égalité en conflit » in 
TRIBUNAL DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE AND BARREAU DU QUÉBEC, supra note 41, 343 at 357-359; Woehrling, 
«L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable », supra note 48, 357 and following.  
210 Multani, supra note 201. 
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minimal impairment211, Justices Deschamps and Abella JJ., in a concurring opinion, viewed that 
they belonged to two different analytical categories212. This intellectual quandary over whether there 
should be correspondence or dissonance between reasonable accommodation and minimal 
impairment raises further concerns about the boundaries of reasonable accommodation, and more 
importantly, about freedom of religion. As seen below, a jurisdictional line is drawn between these 
concepts on the basis of the remedy sought. 
 
Reasonable accommodation and minimal impairment were conceptually distinguished most 
recently in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony. As discussed earlier, the obligation of a universal 
photo for drivers’ licenses resulted in questions related to the limits of freedom of religion and that of 
the doctrine of reasonable accommodation. On this point, the majority of the Supreme Court noted 
that “a distinction must be maintained between the reasonable accommodation analysis undertaken 
when applying human rights laws, and the section 1 justification analysis that applies to a claim that 
a law infringes the Charter.”213 As mentioned previously, it is therefore not the outcome (namely the 
fact that there is a Charter violation) but rather the source of the infringement that determines the 
jurisdictional remedy. If a government action or administrative practice infringes on Charter rights, 
remedy is sought under section 24(1) of the Charter; if the validity of the law is at stake – and is not 
justified under the Oakes’ test – then remedy is found under section 52 of the Constitutional Act214. 
The scope of judicial accountability varies, therefore, according to the form of action sought:  while 
the relationship between employer and employee can be envisaged as dynamic215, the same cannot 
be said about the application of general laws. Although the relationship between a legislature and the 
people subject to its laws should not be understood as static (as opposed to dynamic), the majority of 
the Court explains that: 
 
 
211 Multani, supra note 201, ¶ 53. Quoting Professor Woehrling, « Celui qui veut repousser l’obligation 
d’accommodement doit démontrer que l’application intégrale de la norme, sans les exceptions réclamées par le 
demandeur, est nécessaire pour atteindre un objectif législatif légitime et important.  Plus précisément, sous l’empire 
de l’article 1 de la Charte canadienne, en appliquant le test de l’arrêt R. c. Oakes, il faudra démontrer 
successivement que l’application entière de la norme constitue un moyen rationnel d’atteindre l’objectif législatif; 
qu’il n’existe pas de moyens d’y parvenir qui soient moins attentatoires aux droits en cause (critère de l’atteinte 
minimale); enfin, qu’il y a proportionnalité entre les effets bénéfiques de la mesure et ses effets restrictifs.  En fait, le 
critère de l’atteinte minimale, qui est au cœur du test de l’article 1, correspond en grande partie, pour ce qui est des 
concepts, à la défense de contrainte excessive qui permet de s’opposer à l’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable 
dans le cadre des lois sur les droits de la personne.  C’est ce qui ressort du jugement de la Cour suprême dans 
l’affaire Edwards Books, où l’application du critère de l’atteinte minimale amène la Cour à se demander si le 
législateur ontarien, en interdisant l’ouverture des magasins le dimanche et en prévoyant certaines exceptions pour 
ceux qui ferment déjà le samedi, a suffisamment fait d’efforts pour accommoder les commerçants qui, pour des 
raisons religieuses, doivent respecter un jour de repos autre que le dimanche. » : Woehrling, «L’obligation 
d’accommodement raisonnable », supra note 48, 360. 
212 Multani, supra note 201, ¶ 129. 
213 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 66. 
214 Ibid, ¶ 66-67. 
215 Ibid, ¶ 67-68. 
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“[b]y their very nature, laws of general application are not tailored to the 
unique needs of individual claimants. The legislature has no capacity or 
legal obligation to engage in such an individualized determination, and in 
many cases would have no advance notice of a law’s potential to infringe 
Charter rights.  It cannot be expected to tailor a law to every possible future 
contingency, or every sincerely held religious belief.  Laws of general 
application affect the general public, not just the claimants before the court.  
The broader societal context in which the law operates must inform the s. 1 
justification analysis.”216 
 
In conceiving that no legal obligation exists between the legislature and the individual, the 
majority of the Court was effectively stating that a law does not have to be a priori facially 
neutral before the citizen. This approach to the responsibility and accountability of the legislature 
is worrisome, since it handily provides an exit strategy or carte blanche to the legislature under 
the auspices of a “societal perspective”217. 
 
While the following cases do not deal with the reasonable accommodation of religion, 
McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de 
l’Hôpital général de Montréal218 and Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employé(e)s de techniques 
professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ)219, heralded, in 
my view, the shift in the burden of demonstration of the State found in Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony. In both McGill Health Centre and Hydro-Québec, the employer had authorized 
absences that were not provided for in the collective agreement220. In Hydro-Québec, the 
interpretation and application of the undue hardship standard constituted the central question221, 
whereas the application of a termination employment clause was pivotal in McGill Health 
Centre222. Both cases converged on the issue of the employer’s obligation: “the employer’s duty 
to accommodate ends where the employee is no longer able to fulfill the basic obligations 
                                                 
216 Ibid, ¶ 69 [my emphasis]. 
217 Ibid, ¶ 70-71.   
218 McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de 
Montréal, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161 [McGill Health Centre]. 
219 Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section 
locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 561 [Hydro-Québec]. 
220 McGill Health Centre, supra note 218, ¶ 32; Hydro-Québec, ibid, ¶ 17. 
221 Hydro-Québec, supra note 219, ¶ 9. The test for undue hardship was described as follows at paragraph 18 of 
Hydro-Québec: “Thus, the test for undue hardship is not total unfitness for work in the foreseeable future. If the 
characteristics of an illness are such that the proper operation of the business is hampered excessively or if an 
employee with such an illness remains unable to work for the reasonably foreseeable future even though the 
employer has tried to accommodate him or her, the employer will have satisfied the test. In these circumstances, the 
impact of the standard will be legitimate and the dismissal will be deemed to be non-discriminatory.” The Supreme 
Court in McGill Health Centre stressed that “[u]ndue hardship resulting from the employee’s absence must be 
assessed globally starting from the beginning of the absence, not from the expiry of the three-year period.” 
222 McGill Health Centre, supra note 218, ¶ 10, 25. 
40 
 
Dia DABBY, « Of Eureka Moments and Magic Barometers: Freedom of Religion as the “First” 
Freedom in the Canadian Constitutional Context » 
 
Droits d’auteur et droits de reproduction. Toutes les demandes de reproduction doivent être 
acheminées à Copibec (reproduction papier) – (514) 288-1664 – 1(800) 717-2022. 
licences@copibec.qc.ca 
                                                
associated with the employment relationship for the foreseeable future.”223 Undue hardship, 
therefore, should benefit from a global analysis, which commences at the time that the first 
instance occurred, rather than be addressed as an afterthought to the situation224. Both McGill 
Health Centre and Hydro-Québec demonstrated that despite the employer’s measures of 
accommodation, the employee was incapable of resuming their duties; the employer was therefore 
discharged of his duty of accommodation. Shifting to Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, the 
majority of the Court opined that the Charter does not indemnify practitioners against all 
incidental costs related to the practice of religion, even though freedom of religion is 
guaranteed225. 
 
This approach signals that unaddressed criticisms and shortfalls of the doctrine of 
reasonable accommodation, as applied to freedom of religion, persist. In the following section, I 
will attempt to address the concerns raised by authors. 
 
 
1.4.1.2 The Doctrine of Reasonable Accommodation 
 
 
The legal framework of reasonable accommodation as applied to freedom of religion has 
endured as a subject of pointed criticism by authors. In the aftermath of the Bouchard-Taylor Report, 
many of these legal question marks were addressed, though certain answers remain unclear and at 
times unsatisfactory. 
 
As seen most recently in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, the very application of legal 
framework of reasonable accommodation to the constitutional context – and in our case freedom of 
religion – has elicited questions. While the concepts of reasonable accommodation and minimal 
impairment were reasonably associated in Multani, these concepts were intellectually distinguished 
in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony. This about-face on the cabal between reasonable 
accommodation and minimal impairment goes a long way in addressing the concerns expressed by 
various authors since Multani. As expressed by Gaudreault-DesBiens, when referring with approval 
to Justices Deschamps and Abella’s minority opinion in Multani, a qualitative difference reigns 
between these concepts226. The importance of conceiving of these legal concepts as intellectually 
 
223 Hydro-Québec, supra note 219, ¶ 19; see also McGill Health Centre, ibid, ¶ 37-38. 
224 McGill Health Centre, ibid, ¶ 33. 
225 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 95-96. In Lavallée c. Commission scolaire des Chênes, 
2009 QCCS 3875 at ¶ 36 [Lavallée], it became possible to discount perceived injustices by attempting to rely only 
on hard and proven facts. However, Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony was not treated under the same angle as 
Lavallée, since the former was interested by the justification of the law under s. 1 of the Charter, whereas the latter 
was focused on the qualification of the harm. 
226 Gaudreault-Desbiens, « Quelques angles morts », supra note 193, 241 at 272. See also Bernatchez, « Enjeux 
juridiques », supra note 193, ¶ 40-42. 
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distinct is crucial, since it should oblige the adjudicator to pay close attention to the context in which 
these demands are made. This point, however, should not be taken for granted, as seen below. 
 
In its current state, according to Bosset and Eid, the legal framework of reasonable 
accommodation does not accurately reflect the vocation and responsibilities held by a public 
institution, since the obligation of reasonable accommodation and the criterion of excessive burden 
have been used almost exclusively in the particular employer-employee relationship227. This 
comment was made in reaction to Multani, since it dealt with a school environment where there was 
marked relationship of unequal forces. The cost-benefit analysis will differ, therefore, according to 
the nature of the relationship, as well as the implications of such an accommodation in a particular 
environment228. A further example demonstrating the difficulty of transposing the framework of 
reasonable accommodation to public institutions is Québec’s now-obscured Bill 16, entitled Loi 
favorisant l’action de l’Administration à l’égard de la diversité culturelle229. In an effort to better 
respond to the cultural diversity of immigrants and their religious practices in particular, the 
government had tabled a bill to enable government organisations to adopt directives to fight 
against discrimination. The fate of this bill has become uncertain given the politically charged 
atmosphere surrounding these debates in Québec. 
 
The balance between the demands of reasonable accommodation and the other values 
enshrined by a charter of rights provides a third point of contention for the legal framework of 
reasonable accommodation. More particularly, when a request for reasonable accommodation of 
religious practices affronts another underlying value of the charter of rights, the legitimacy of the 
solution comes into question230. In an effort to remedy this possible clash of values, the Québec 
government, following the Bouchard-Taylor Report, instituted changes to the Québec Charter in 
 
227 Bosset & Eid, « Droit et religion », supra note 48, ¶ 14. The authors offer the example of a school, which has a 
different vocation and environment than that of an employer: see Multani, supra note 201, ¶ 53, 65. See also 
Bernatchez, « Enjeux juridiques », supra note 193, ¶ 40-42. 
228 For a specific discussion on the implications of different actors requesting a reasonable accommodation of 
freedom of religion in schools, see Woehrling, « Religion à l’école », supra note 193; Bergman Fleury, “Obligation 
d’accommodements et services publics au Québec” in Christian Brunelle and Patrick A. Molinari, eds., Reasonable 
Accommodation and the Role of the State : A Democratic Challenge/Accommodements raisonnables et rôle de 
l’État : un défi démocratique, coll. Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice/Institut canadien 
d’administration de la justice, 2008, at pages 339-361. 
229 Loi favorisant l’action de l’Administration à l’égard de la diversité culturelle, Bill no16 (Specific consultations – 
07-08.10.2009), 1st Sess., 39th Legis., (Qc). According to sources, says journalist Denis Lessard, the controversial 
Bill 16 will simply not follow the usual path at the National Assembly, launching it into the realm of obscurity: 
Denis Lessard, “Accommodements raisonnables: le projet de loi 16 jeté aux oubliettes”, La Presse (October 22, 
2009), online: http://www.cyberpresse.ca/actualites/quebec-canada/politique-quebecoise/200910/22/01-913792-
accomodements-raisonnables-le-projet-de-loi-16-jete-aux-oubliettes.php (site last accessed 22.10.2009)  
230 Bosset & Eid, « Droit et religion », supra note 48, ¶ 15. The authors add, at the same paragraph : « Pour ce motif, 
il arrive que la légitimité des solutions juridiques fondées sur l’accommodement raisonnable soit remise en question. 
Cela semble être le cas, en particulier, lorsque l’égalité des sexes est un élément essentiel du débat. » See also 
Bernatchez, « Enjeux juridiques », supra note 193, ¶ 35-36. 
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order to reflect this new hierarchy of principles. According to the Québec Charter, the rights and 
freedoms declared are explicitly equally guaranteed to women and men231. 
 
The doctrine of reasonable accommodation, as applied to claims of religious freedom, must 
proceed with caution, as illustrated through our brief overview. It must also take into account the 
context in which the accommodation is asserted, the rights and implications for the various actors 
involved and the consequential management of multiple rights.  
 
Balancing rights and obligations can be accomplished under the doctrine of reasonable 
accommodation, but also under the proportionality test, know as the Oakes’ test. I now turn to this 
form of managing multiple rights. 
 
 
1.4.2 Proportionality under the Charter: Oakes’ Test Revisited 
 
R. v. Oakes232 sets out the appropriate standard of proof to adopt under section 1 of the 
Charter233. The Oakes’ test represented the second step in determining an infringement of rights: 
firstly, one must demonstrate that a Charter right or freedom was breached; secondly, one must 
determine whether this breach represented a reasonable limit within a free and democratic society. 
Two central criteria must therefore be satisfied to answer whether the limit is reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society: 
 
“First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a 
Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be "of sufficient 
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or 
freedom"” 
 
Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the 
party invoking s. 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and 
demonstrably justified. […] First, the measures adopted must be carefully 
designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, 
unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally 
connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to 
the objective in this first sense, should impair "as little as possible" the right 
 
231 See Québec Charter, supra note 38, Preamble and art. 50.1. 
232 Oakes, supra note 55. 
233 Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 46, establishes the following: “The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” [my 
emphasis]. A similar limit is imposed by s. 9(1) of the Québec Charter, supra note 38, which reads that “[i]n exercising 
his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public 
order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec.” [my emphasis] 
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or freedom in question: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, at p. 352. Third, 
there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are 
responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which 
has been identified as of "sufficient importance".234 
 
Applied to cases where freedom of religion is threatened, as explained by Chief Justice 
Dickson (writing for Chouinard and Le Dain JJ.) in Edwards Books, “[i]t matters not […] whether a 
coercive burden is direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, foreseeable or unforeseeable. All 
coercive burdens on the exercise of religious beliefs are potentially within the ambit of s. 2(a).”235 
This should not be interpreted, however, as warns Chief Justice Dickson, to mean any and all 
burdens on religious practices: a difference thus reigns between costs that are considered substantial 
and those that are considered trivial236. Nevertheless, as stated in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony, no “magic barometer” exists to measure the seriousness of a particular limit on a religious 
practice237; every case must be evaluated on its own merits and implications. While the implications 
of the incidental and unintended consequences in Edwards Books and Multani led to a curtailment 
of ‘meaningful choices’, the notion of social good prevailed over that of religious practice in 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, according to the majority238. Achieving balance between the 
salutary and deleterious effects under the ambit of section 1 Charter analysis also compels us to 
consider the underlying Charter values in this equation, such as liberty, human dignity, equality, 
autonomy and the enhancement of democracy239.  
 
When invoked, the Oakes’ test obliges us to find balance between individual and collective 
rights but also asks us to manage the concrete and underlying discourses in the Charter240. In so 
doing, one attempts to balance on one side while accommodating on the other, all the while paying 
heed to the underlying discourse of Charter values.  Given the result in Hutterian Brethren of 
                                                 
234 Oakes, supra note 55, ¶ 69-70. 
235 Edwards Books, supra note 47, ¶ 96. 
236 Edwards Books, supra note 47, ¶ 97. Dickson C.J. provided necessary insight into the tenets of freedom of 
religion, as well as the balancing act that must occur between this fundamental freedom and other rights protected: 
“The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's 
perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, 
govern one's conduct and practices. The Constitution shelters individuals and groups only to the extent that religious 
beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened. For a state-imposed cost or burden to be proscribed by s. 
2(a) it must be capable of interfering with religious belief or practice.” (Ibid, ¶ 97) 
237 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 89. 
238 Ibid, ¶ 96. 
239 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, ¶ 125 [Thomson Newspapers] 
and Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. British Columbia, [2007] 2 
S.C.R. 391, ¶ 81 [Health Services and Support], as cited in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 
88. 
240 See Benjamin L. Berger, “Moral Judgment, Criminal Law and the Constitutional Protection of Religion” (2008) 
40 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 513, 534 [Berger, “Moral Judgment”]. 
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Wilson Colony, I believe that claims related to freedom of religion will increasingly be treated under 
the banner of proportionality, rather than that of accommodation. 
 
 
2. Unresolved Issues Pertaining to Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
As the title indicates, I will proceed to a discussion of the unresolved issues pertaining to 
freedom of religion in Canada; freedom of conscience, in its various interpretations, will be 
addressed in the following section. I have elected to focus on three interrelated points that have 
not reached consensus in the legal community: the sincerity of the belief and the individual (2.1), 
the place of expert evidence and the impact on community views of religion (2.2) and a child’s 
right to freedom of conscience and religion (2.3). In closing, I will offer a brief conclusion on 
freedom of religion in Canada (2.4). 
 
 
 
2.1 The Sincerity of the Belief and the Individual 
 
 
In establishing a test based on the sincerity of a claimant’s beliefs241, the majority of the 
Supreme Court in Amselem effectively offered a “hypersubjective definition of religion”242. 
While this approach can be applauded for bestowing unparalleled flexibility to a customarily 
formalistic subject, it has also been criticised for painting (and subsequently endorsing) a 
reductionist view of religion and beliefs in law. The sincerity of belief test will be addressed from 
three different yet interrelated points: the very notion of “sincerity”; the public implications of 
private beliefs; and the paradigmatic shift from these public implications to cultural identity. 
                                                
 
Being “sincere” generally implies “proceeding from or characterized by genuine feelings; 
free from deceit” according to the Compact Oxford English Dictionary243. Applied to the context 
 
241 Amselem, supra note 84, ¶ 53: “Assessment of sincerity is a question of fact that can be based on several non-
exhaustive criteria, including the credibility of a claimant’s testimony, as well as an analysis of whether the alleged 
belief is consistent with his or her other current religious practices.  It is important to underscore, however, that it is 
inappropriate for courts rigorously to study and focus on the past practices of claimants in order to determine 
whether their current beliefs are sincerely held.  Over the course of a lifetime, individuals change and so can their 
beliefs.  Religious beliefs, by their very nature, are fluid and rarely static.  A person’s connection to or relationship 
with the divine or with the subject or object of his or her spiritual faith, or his or her perceptions of religious 
obligation emanating from such a relationship, may well change and evolve over time.  Because of the vacillating 
nature of religious belief, a court’s inquiry into sincerity, if anything, should focus not on past practice or past belief 
but on a person’s belief at the time of the alleged interference with his or her religious freedom.” 
242 Solange Lefebvre, “Between Law and Public Opinion” in Beaman & Beyer, supra note 194, 175 at 194. 
243 COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY “Sincere”, 3rd ed. rev. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, online: 
http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/sincere?view=uk (site last accessed 05.11.2009). 
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of freedom of religion and sincerely held beliefs, sincerity requires the good faith of the 
claimant244. As articulated by Benjamin Berger, “[v]eracity is for the public, sincerity is for the 
private, and all that the law requires of religion is sincerity of belief.”245 A distinction is therefore 
established between what constitutes good faith and what is factually correct, which falls in line 
with the Supreme Court’s approach not to challenge the character of the belief. Beyond this initial 
point on the semantics of sincerity, a more serious argument is made against the actual 
construction of the sincerity test. The Supreme Court’s justification of the existence of the 
“sincerity test” before Amselem has irked Ogilvie and Beaman, who argue that such a 
construction is unfounded246. In both R. v. Jones247 and Attis v. New Brunswick School District 
No. 15248, claims of subjective sincerity were simply accepted or assumed249. This differs from 
the actual language used by the Supreme Court, who implied a historical use of a subjective test. 
Although subjective claims were accepted in aforementioned cases, Ogilvie also points to 
Bruker250 where the Supreme Court doubted the sincerity of the husband’s beliefs for the first 
time. She notes that “Bruker demonstrates how the subjective sincerity test for section 2(a) has the 
potential to bring the courts into disrepute by appearing to be taking sides in a religious 
dispute.”251 To this example, I add that of Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, where sincerity 
of belief was acknowledged, but the majority of the Supreme Court cautioned that this alone did 
not guarantee protection252. Nevertheless, it is not so much the issue of “taking sides”, since by 
nature that is what courts are meant to do as adjudicators. Rather, the problem is offering strong 
reasons in support of taking one side and not the other, in my opinion. Perhaps the most vocal 
critic of the subjective sincerity test, Ogilvie has not minced words when expressing her distaste 
for the avenue chosen by the Supreme Court, calling it a “flimsy and unstable basis for protecting 
religion.”253 
 
 
244 Amselem, supra note 84, ¶ 51. 
245 Benjamin Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture”, (2007) 45(2) Osgoode Hall L.J. 277, 308. 
246 Amselem, supra note 84, ¶ 44, 51. 
247 Jones, supra note 60, at 295. 
248 Ross, supra note 73. 
249 Margaret H. Ogilvie, “Bruker v. Marcovitz: (Get)ting Over Freedoms (Like Contract and Religion) in Canada, 
(2008/2009) 24 N.J.C.L. 173, 187 [Ogilvie, “(Get)ting Over Freedoms”]; Lori G. Beaman, “Defining Religion: 
The Promise and the Peril of Legal Interpretation” in Moon, supra note 48, 192 at 205 [Beaman, “Defining 
Religion”]. 
250 Bruker, supra note108, ¶ 68-69. 
251 Ogilvie, “(Get)ting Over Freedoms”, supra note 249, 187-188. This was also suggested by Berger, “Law’s 
Religion”, supra note 245, 303. 
252 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 69, ¶ 8, 69. 
253 Margaret H. Ogilvie, “And Then There was One: Freedom of Religion in Canada – the Incredibly Shrinking 
Concept” (2008) 10 Eccl. L.J. 197, 203 [Ogilvie, “Incredibly Shrinking Concept”]; Ogilvie, “(Get)ting Over 
Freedoms”, supra note 249, 187. M.H. Ogilvie also remarked that “[a]pparently, it is easier to determine whether a 
claimant sincerely believes a self-defined belief than the content of, say, the Nicene creed!”: Ogilvie, “Incredibly 
Shrinking Concept”, ibid, at 199. 
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When engaging in a test of sincerely-held beliefs, it becomes difficult to ignore that 
“[r]eligious beliefs or values have public implications.”254 Lefebvre noted that it is important to 
reflect on the “reasonable” interval within which the sincerity of the belief should be located255. 
She adds that, although an individual can seek emancipation from religious constraints, an 
individual can alternatively also reaffirm conformity to religious orthodoxy256. The consequences 
of private beliefs underscore the general ambiguity of where religious beliefs should be situated 
on a societal scale. More specifically, the consequences of private beliefs on public spheres of 
activity in Canadian constitutional law illustrate the awkward silence between individual and 
“collective dimension of religious life”257. Berger has referred to this as the “deafness to the 
centrality of the community.”258 Nevertheless, this approach reflects the individual’s choice and 
personal autonomy vis-à-vis that of the community and more generally, the political culture of 
liberalism, argues Berger259. Moreover, he has suggested that the community is essential to 
determining what inevitably can be considered religion260. Seen from a different perspective, 
although the beliefs espoused by the individual might not be those of the ‘community’ at the end 
of the day, there is an undeniable role played by the community as actor and reactor to the 
opinions of the members261.  
 
 
254 Richard Moon, “Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: Religious Freedom under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms” (2002-2003) 41 Brandeis L.J. 563, 571 [Moon, “Liberty, Neturality and Inclusion”]; Richard Moon, 
“Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 201, 219 
[Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity]. 
255 Solange Lefebvre, “La liberté religieuse modelée par les effets paradoxaux de la modernité” in Gaudreault-
Desbiens, supra note 193, 195 at 211. 
256 Ibid, 202-203. 
257 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 245, 290. 
258 Ibid, 290. 
259 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 245, 283. The author concludes, at page 314, that “[m]ore profoundly, 
there is a fundamental, though eminently explicable, shortfall at the core of liberal legal discourse. Religion is not 
only what law imagines it to be. Law is blind to critical aspects of religion as culture.” 
260 Bruce Ryder, “State Neutrality and Freedom of Conscience and Religion” (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 169 at 
197 [Ryder, “State Neutrality”]: “Without any demonstrated religious connection apart from the claimant’s 
asserted sincere belief, is it possible to determine when personal opinions become “religious”?”; see also Rosalie 
Jukier and Shauna Van Praagh, “Civil Law and Religion in the Supreme Court of Canada: What Should We Get out 
of Bruker v. Marcovitz?” (2008) 43 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 381 [Jukier & Van Praagh, “Civil Law and Religion”]. 
On the relationship between the individual’s beliefs and the religious community in the specific realm of a child’s 
rights, see Shauna Van Praagh, “Faith, Belonging, and the Protection of “Our Children”” (1999) 17 Windsor Y.B. 
Access Just. 154 [Van Praagh, “Protection of “Our” Children”]. 
261 Richard Moon speaks of the importance of the community in shaping religious opinions and perspectives of the 
individual and providing a “moral framework” for the individual: see Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity”, 
supra note 254, 234; Richard Moon, “Bruker v. Marcovitz”: Divorce and the Marriage of Law and Religion (2008) 
42 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 37, 58 [Moon, “Marriage of Law and Religion”]. 
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More recently, the justification of the protection of freedom of conscience and religion has 
been re-branded as a question of (cultural) identity rather than (personal) autonomy262. One needs 
only to turn to the opening sentences of Bruker to feel this operational shift263. While this “partial 
or ambiguous shift” has been observed by Moon, it can be attributed in part to a rise of secularism 
but also be understood through the courts’ ambiguous view of religion and its value264. 
Interestingly, while Berger concedes the appeal of the logic of equality and its natural note in 
law’s understanding of religion, he ultimately concludes that the overarching liberal tone is 
always one of choice and autonomy265, as reflected by Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration)266. However, he remarked that “perhaps the most contentious current point of 
debate is the relationship between culture itself and choice.”267 While I agree that this 
reformulation of the problem focuses on culture’s understanding of ‘voluntariness and free 
will’268, I consider that this ultimately remains a question of how one goes about defining religion 
in law. I draw on Moon to support my conclusion on this point. As expressed by Moon, “to regard 
a religious community as an association that members join and quit at will, is to miss both the 
value of religious association and its potential to limit and sometimes even oppress its 
 
262 While this has been treated previously in the discussion on freedom of conscience (section 2), I will address the 
shift from the perspective of freedom of religion. 
263 Bruker, supra note 108, ¶ 1-2: 
“[1] Canada rightly prides itself on its evolutionary tolerance for diversity and pluralism.  This journey has included 
a growing appreciation for multiculturalism, including the recognition that ethnic, religious or cultural differences 
will be acknowledged and respected.  Endorsed in legal instruments ranging from the statutory protections found in 
human rights codes to their constitutional enshrinement in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the right 
to integrate into Canada’s mainstream based on and notwithstanding these differences has become a defining part of 
our national character. 
 [2] The right to have differences protected, however, does not mean that those differences are always hegemonic.  
Not all differences are compatible with Canada’s fundamental values and, accordingly, not all barriers to their 
expression are arbitrary.  Determining when the assertion of a right based on difference must yield to a more 
pressing public interest is a complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies bright- line application.  It is, at the 
same time, a delicate necessity for protecting the evolutionary integrity of both multiculturalism and public 
confidence in its importance.” 
264 Richard Moon, “Government Support for Religious Practice” in Moon, supra note 48, 217 at 218-219. 
265 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 245, 298; Benjamin Berger, “Law’s Religion” in Moon, supra note 48, 264 
at 276. The author continues at the same page in his Osgoode Hall Law Journal article: “[t]hat there has been some 
legal statement made about the value of your identity gets you in the section 15 door; once there, however, the 
analytic force of the identity judgment is largely spent.” 
266 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [Law] 
267 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 245, 299-300 (footnote 83). On the pull between culture itself and choice, 
Berger refers to Natasha Bakht’s recent study for the National Association of Women and the Law in 2005 entitled 
Arbitration, Religion and Family Law: Private Justice on the Backs of Women, available online:  <National 
Association of Women and the Law>, <Publications>, <Reseach and Working Papers>, 
http://www.nawl.ca/ns/en/documents/Pub_Report_ReligArb05_en.pdf (site last accessed 05.11.2009), especially 
pages 17-20. 
268 To borrow Natasha Bakht’s terminology, supra, at 17-18. 
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members.”269 Beyond my scope of study but of deep interest, the interweaving of exit theory and 
minority rights, especially when coupled with religion, merits further analysis within the 
Canadian constitutional context. Given the prior analysis, I consider that a more contextual 
approach to religion in law will enable a better appreciation of the unequivocal cultural 
component of religion and perhaps lessen the focus on political liberalism and by extension, the 
‘autonomous’ individual. 
 
 
 
2.2 The Place of Expert Evidence and the Impact on Community Views of 
Religion 
 
 
In devising a test based on the sincerity of beliefs, the Supreme Court in Amselem 
discouraged recourse to expert testimony. The consequences of the Court’s positioning were 
twofold: first, the use of expert evidence testimony to circumscribe the content of a religion was 
set aside; second, the importance of “community religious views as determinate aspects of 
religion”270 was also abandoned. The majority view of the Supreme Court’s choice was explained 
as follows: 
 
“[a] claimant may choose to adduce expert evidence to demonstrate that his or 
her belief is consistent with the practices and beliefs of other adherents of the 
faith.  While such evidence may be relevant to a demonstration of sincerity, it 
is not necessary.  Since the focus of the inquiry is not on what others view the 
claimant’s religious obligations as being, but rather what the claimant views 
these personal   religious “obligations” to be, it is inappropriate to require 
expert opinions to show sincerity of belief.  An “expert” or an authority on 
religious law is not the surrogate for an individual’s affirmation of what his or 
her religious beliefs are. Religious belief is intensely personal and can easily 
vary from one individual to another.  Requiring proof of the established 
practices of a religion to gauge the sincerity of belief diminishes the very 
freedom we seek to protect.”271 
 
This position is comprehensible since it follows the Court’s choice not to become the 
arbiter of religious dogma272; it is however regrettable, since it restricts the terms of the debate on 
components of religion. In light of Amselem, Beaman distinguishes between an expert providing 
 
269 Moon, “Marriage of Law and Religion”, supra note 261, 62. See also Beaman, “Defining Religion” in Moon, 
supra note 48, 206. 
270 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 245, 286 (at footnote 29). 
271 Amselem, supra note 84, ¶ 54 [my emphasis]. 
272 Ibid, ¶ 50. 
49 
 
Lex Electronica, vol. 15 n°2 (Automne/Autumn 2010) 
 
Droits d’auteur et droits de reproduction. Toutes les demandes de reproduction doivent être 
acheminées à Copibec (reproduction papier) – (514) 288-1664 – 1(800) 717-2022. 
licences@copibec.qc.ca 
 
                                                
evidence about the sincerity of belief (“individual experiences”) and giving evidence about the 
content of a particular religion (“essences”)273. This push-and-pull between experiences and 
essences becomes another expression of the dilemma of defining religion in law. The case-law 
has since vacillated on this point, causing one to question how the issue of expert testimony 
should be dealt with when faced with claims of religious freedom. Multani presented an example 
of drawing on both individual experiences and essences274, leading to inconsistent interpretations 
as to the weight attributed to evidence in religious claims275. According to Jamal, Multani 
provided an interesting approach to finding creative (and economical) sources in lieu of expert 
evidence276. The public domain of religion as addressed in Multani – also explained as a surgical 
approach to constructing an evidentiary record, according to the author277 - warrants closer 
examination. The source of affidavits explaining the tenets of Sikhism remains religious, since 
they were offered by Sikh chaplains: although no “expert testimony” was presented, ‘expert’ 
religious opinions were offered on a code of belief. At best, the line between direct approbation of 
the existence of a religion and that of its religious expression becomes conceptually hazy. The 
evidence in Multani was interpreted in a different way by Lefebvre, who considered that recourse 
to Sikh chaplains signalled that religious experts’ opinions could be taken into account in 
judgments278. The question now becomes whether this religious opinion evidence should be part 
of the foreground or background of a judgment. While the question of expert testimony is 
seemingly innocuous at the outset, it points to a deeper question of how law views the place of 
religion within the public or private sphere279.   
 
This approach was not followed, however, in the next pre-eminent case on freedom of 
religion at the Supreme Court. In Bruker, it was inferred by the Supreme Court that Mass J. of the 
Québec Superior Court came to a conclusion on whether the get should be granted immediately 
based on the expert evidence presented280. More recently, expert opinion evidence was employed 
to demonstrate the religious beliefs and attitudes in relation to gay marriage281. More particularly, 
Dr. Bryan Hillis testified in the case of an appeal of a complaint made to the Saskatchewan 
Human Rights Commission, which had found that the marriage commissioner had discriminated 
 
273 Beaman, “Defining Religion” in Moon, supra note 48, 202. 
274 Beaman, “Defining Religion” in Moon, supra note 48, 202. 
275 Multani, supra note 201, ¶ 36. 
276 Mahmud Jamal, “Freedom of Religion in the Supreme Court: Some Lessons from Multani” (2006/2007) 21 
N.J.C.L. 291, 306 [Jamal, “Some Lessons from Multani”]. The evidentiary record was relatively modest, 
according to the author at the same page, consisting of affidavit evidence explaining the tenets of Sikhism; 
documents relating to the interaction with school authorities and several newspaper articles filed with the courts 
below on the experiences of other school boards’ across Canada in accommodating the kirpan. 
277 Ibid, 306. 
278 Lefebvre, « Liberté religieuse modelée » in Gaudreault-DesBiens, supra note 193, 195 at 208. 
279 See Ogilvie, “Incredibly Shrinking Concept”, supra note 253, 202; Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 245, 
286; Ogilvie, “(Get)ting Over Freedoms”, supra note 249, 183-188; Beaman, “Defining Religion”, supra note 4, 
202; Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity”, supra note 254, 218. 
280 Bruker, supra note 108, ¶ 33. 
281 Nichols v. M.J., 2009 SKQB 299 [Nichols], ¶ 17. 
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against the complainant when he refused to perform a marriage on the basis of discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation. According to the expert evidence, no marked difference exists 
in attitudes between Christianity and other religions that mariage is a sacred act282. McMurty J., 
for the Queen’s Bench, found that the marriage commissioner’s personal religious beliefs should 
ultimately be set aside given his role as a government official283.  
 
Interestingly, expert evidence has also been used to demonstrate that Falun Gong should 
be recognised as a creed within the meaning of the Ontario Human Rights Code284. Indeed, while 
the evidence was used to demonstrate the existence of a creed or religion, it had to do so by 
relying on the practices that constitute Falun Gong. This creates a strange standard for Falun 
Gong, since it is “legitimised” by western standards but “vilified” as a cult where practioners face 
persecution in China.  
 
Just as expert evidence has been used to adduce the existence of certain religious practices 
or religions, expert evidence can also serve to discredit or render religious claims suspect in the 
eyes of the law. The issue of “spirituality” when addressing Aboriginal claims illustrates the 
dischord between ancestral rights and interpretation of freedom of religion. For example, although 
the Charter was not enacted when Jack and Charlie v. The Queen285 was brought before the 
courts, the decision remains central in understanding how the parcelling of identity can occur, 
according to Beaman286. According to Leclair, the Aboriginal world is one where the sacred and 
the profane coincide287. By conceiving of space in a different manner, it is not surprising that 
Aboriginal claims are not often addressed within the discourse on freedom of religion, but rather 
framed as issues pertaining to treaty rights or title rights288. In doing so, rarely are claims assessed 
on an individual basis but rather in terms of group rights and according to the pre-existence of 
aboriginal societies289, the latter known as “autochtonité” according to Otis290. The coupling of 
 
282 Ibid, ¶ 17. 
283 Ibid, ¶ 76. 
284 Huang v. 1233065 Ontario Inc. (Ottawa Senior Chinese Cultural Association), 2006 HRTO 1 (CanLII), ¶ 55, 66. 
285 Jack and Charlie v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 332 [Jack and Charlie].   
286 Lori G. Beaman, “Aboriginal Spirituality and the Legal Construction of Freedom of Religion” in Lori G. Beaman 
(ed.), Religion and Canadian Society: Traditions, Transitions, and Innovations, Toronto, Canadian Scholars’ Press 
Inc., 2006, p. 229 at page 233-234 [Beaman, “Aboriginal Spirituality”]. In Jack and Charlie, the Court opined 
that the killing of a deer was not an integral part of the sacred ceremony. This rejoins Ghislain Otis’ comment when 
wondering if “[l]a plus haute juridiction canadienne ne s’érige-t-elle pas en grand tribunal religieux lorsqu’elle 
s’arroge l’autorité de décréter quelles coutumes ou pratiques religieuses d’origine précoloniale peuvent être 
reconnues comme des « caractéristiques déterminantes de la culture distinctive » d’une collectivité autochtone? » : 
see Ghislain Otis, “Revendications foncières, “autochtonité” et liberté de religion au Canada” (1999) 40 C. de D. 
741, 764 [references omitted] [Otis, « Autochtonité »]. 
287 Jean Leclair, “Le droit et le sacré ou la recherche d’un point d’appui absolu” in Gaudreault-Desbiens, supra note 
193, 475 at 481. 
288 Beaman, “Aboriginal Spirituality”, supra note 286, at 234, 238; Otis, « Autochtonité », supra note 286, 772. 
289 See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [Van der Peet], ¶ 30-31 as cited by Otis, « Autochtonité », supra 
note 286, 750 (footnote 21). The case of Thomas v. Norris, [1992] 2 C.N.L.R. 139 (B.C.S.C.) [Thomas], as cited 
51 
 
Lex Electronica, vol. 15 n°2 (Automne/Autumn 2010) 
 
Droits d’auteur et droits de reproduction. Toutes les demandes de reproduction doivent être 
acheminées à Copibec (reproduction papier) – (514) 288-1664 – 1(800) 717-2022. 
licences@copibec.qc.ca 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
religious freedom with the pre-existence of aboriginal rights warrants a discussion in and of itself; 
my purpose here is only to highlight the difficulty of resolving such a dispute in the face of 
conflicting ‘expert’ views of the individual and the community.  
 
The weight of expert evidence testimony in cases of religious freedom should also be 
considered in light of the doctrine of judicial notice. In 2005, the judicial notice of social facts 
was clarified by Justice Binnie in R. v. Spence291. While the Supreme Court said that recourse to 
expert testimony was unnecessary in Amselem in 2004, it found that legislative and “social facts” 
should be established by expert testimony in Spence in 2005292.  
 
At issue in Spence was whether the trial judge was right in refusing to permit the following 
question that was directed to the jury: “[w]ould your ability to judge the evidence in this case 
without bias, prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact that the accused person is a black man 
 
and discussed by Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens and Diane Labrèche in Le contexte social du droit dans le 
Québec contemporain: l’intelligence culturelle dans la pratique des juristes (Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 
2009), at pages 121-124, represents an exception to individual claims and religious rights. At issue was whether 
non-pecuniary aggravated, punitive and special damages should be awarded to plaintiff after having endured, 
according to him, assault, battery and false imprisonment during the “Spirit Dancing” tradition. David Thomas, the 
plaintiff, was considered an “Indian” within the meaning of the Indian Act, 1985 R.S.C. (1985), c. 1-5, yet had been 
brought up off the Reserve and had very little to do with and interest in that culture over the years. Amongst 
defenses provided, the defendants claimed that they had a legal right to initiate the plaintiff, “pursuant to their 
constitutionally protected right to exercise an existing aboriginal right within the meaning of s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. The aboriginal right claimed by the defendants is their right to carry on and exercise the 
Tradition, which is called the Coast Salish Spirit Dance.” (Thomas, supra, 3-4). According to Mr. Justice Hood, “s. 
35(1) is not applicable in the case at bar. Assuming that spirit dancing was an aboriginal right, and that it existed and 
was practised prior to the assertion of British sovereignty over Vancouver Island, and the imposition of English law, 
in my opinion those aspects of it which were contrary to English common law, such as the use of force, assault, 
battery and wrongful imprisonment, did not survive the coming into force of that law, which occurred on Vancouver 
Island in 1846 or, at the latest, in 1866, when the two colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia were 
merged.” (Thomas, supra, 24) A distinction is also drawn between a right and a freedom by the judge, noting that 
the former is not absolute in the case and does not include civil immunity from unlawful tortious conduct (Thomas, 
supra, 25). Nonpecuniary damages, including exemplary damages, were ultimately awarded to the plaintiff for pain 
and suffering during his ordeal (Thomas, supra, 26-27). 
290 Ghislain Otis warns that “autochtonité” should only be understood as a source of sui generis religious rights due 
to their exclusive constitutional status (through s. 35 of the 1982 Constitutional Act) and not as a bearer of freedom 
of religion, which presupposes the absence of constraint: see Otis, “Autochtonité”, supra note 286, 762. 
291 R. v. Spence, 2005 SCC 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458 [Spence]. The section on judicial notice and R. v. Spence was 
originally written as part of a paper entitled “Speaking (Out?) in Tongues: The Impact of R. v. R.D.S.”, submitted to 
Professor Danielle Pinard in partial fulfilment of requirements for “Droit constitutionnel avancé” (DRT 6845A) 
given at the Faculty of Law of Université de Montréal (Fall 2006 term).  
292 Spence, supra note 291, ¶ 68: “The suggestion that even legislative and social “facts” should be established by 
expert testimony rather than reliance on judicial notice was also made in cases as different from one another as Find, 
Moysa, Danson, at p. 1101, Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, Waldick v. Malcolm, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 456, at 
pp. 472-73, Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, at pp. 549-50, R. v. Penno, [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 865, at pp. 881-82, and MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357.  Litigants who disregard the suggestion 
proceed at some risk.” 
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charged with robbing an East Indian person?”293 As such, did the trial judge’s refusal constitute 
an infringement on the accused’s right to an impartial jury and therefore a fair trial? Justice Binnie 
stipulates that judicial notice of facts should be done on a sliding scale: the more central the fact is 
to the case, the more stringent the test of judicial notice, whereas if a fact is of reference or 
background, it is more likely to be admitted. This method reflects the approach favoured by 
author K.C. Davis, where “the permissible scope of judicial notice should vary according to the 
nature of the issue under consideration.”294 Therefore, according to Binnie J.,  
 
“When asked to take judicial notice of matters falling between the high end 
already discussed where the Morgan criteria will be insisted upon, and the low 
end of background facts where the court will likely proceed (consciously or 
unconsciously) on the basis that the matter is beyond serious controversy, I 
believe a court ought to ask itself whether such “fact” would be accepted by 
reasonable people who have taken the trouble to inform themselves on the topic 
as not being the subject of reasonable dispute for the particular purpose for 
which it is to be used, keeping in mind that the need for reliability and 
trustworthiness increases directly with the centrality of the “fact” to the 
disposition of the controversy.”295  
 
Justice Binnie is suggesting the creation of a mid-level test for judicially noticing facts that 
lie in between the centre and the extreme periphery of the case296. One could imagine such a test 
of judicial notice as being represented by a funnel. By introducing the requirement of the 
‘reasonable person’, an additional burden is put on said person, since it is no longer the test of a 
reasonable person placed in the same circumstances, but rather, a reasonable person, placed in the 
same circumstances, and also having gone to the trouble of informing themselves on the topic at 
bar. The additional criterion of information on the case at bar would serve as a safeguard to insure 
the reliability and trustworthiness of the reasonable person. I am of the opinion that although the 
creation of such a test is necessary to consider and judicially notice certain facts, it creates a 
substantial burden on the reasonable person.  
 
                                                 
293 Spence, supra, ¶ 1. It should be noted that the question draws from R. v. Parks, (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3rd) 353 (Ont. 
C.A.), 353, where the question was: “[w]ould your ability to judge the evidence in the case without bias, prejudice 
or partiality be affected by the fact that the person charged is … black … and the deceased is a white man?” 
294 Spence, supra note 291, ¶ 60. It should be noted that paragraph 60 of R. v. Spence is treated and cited in 
Professor Danielle Pinard’s outline entitled “La connaissance d’office en matière factuelle: pistes de réflexion” 
(20.11.2006), p.17. 
295 Spence, supra, ¶ 65 [my emphasis]. It should be noted that paragraph 65 of R. v. Spence is treated and cited in 
Professor Danielle Pinard’s outline entitled “La connaissance d’office en matière factuelle: pistes de réflexion” 
(20.11.2006), p.19.  
296 It should be noted that this point was brought up by the author of this paper and Professor Danielle Pinard, in the 
context of her class on constitutional proof. 
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 For the Court, Binnie J. surmises that the submissions put forth by the African Canadian 
Legal Clinic and the respondent represent a shift that would be too fundamental, and declines to 
take judicial notice of different aspects of racism. In closing, he adds a comment that has the 
potential to forever change the face of judicial notice of social science facts evidence:  
 
“The suggestion that even legislative and social “facts” should be 
established by expert testimony rather than reliance on judicial notice was 
also made in cases as different from one another as Find, Moysa, Danson, at 
p. 1101, Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, Waldick v. Malcolm, [1991] 
2 S.C.R. 456, at pp. 472-73, Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 
3 S.C.R. 483, at pp. 549-50, R. v. Penno, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 865, at pp. 881-82, 
and MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357.  Litigants who disregard the 
suggestion proceed at some risk.”297 
 
Justice Binnie admits that this approach would disadvantage certain litigants, but 
determines that considerations related to trial fairness should be dealt with separately in order to 
avoid diluting the doctrine of judicial notice298. This attempt to regulate the doctrine of judicial 
notice is thorny, as certain authors have admitted299, though the parameters are far from finalised.  
Given the slightly disjointed nature of the classification of facts in R. v. Spence, with legislative 
facts – derived from the Davis model – on one side, and “social facts” – stemming from the 
Monahan and Walker model – on the other, I consider that a further attempt should be made in 
understanding the doctrine of judicial notice in order to not weaken it by misrepresentation. 
 
Although the issue of expert evidence and the impact on community views of religion is 
addressed in a secondary manner by the Supreme Court in Amselem, it is clear that it is essential 
to a better understanding of religion in law. Insofar as the opinions of experts should be carefully 
assessed and appreciated, as noted by the courts, one must distinguish between protecting a 
community practice at the expense of an individual’s beliefs and protecting a community practice 
in the interests of preserving a religious tradition.  
 
297Spence, supra note 291, ¶ 68 [my emphasis]. It should be noted that paragraph 68 of R. v. Spence is treated and 
cited in Professor Danielle Pinard’s outline entitled “La connaissance d’office en matière factuelle: pistes de 
réflexion” (20.11.2006), p.19-20.  
298 Spence, supra, ¶ 69. In conclusion, at paragraph 77: “But in this case, with respect, I do not think fairness to the 
accused or the vitally necessary appearance of fairness was compromised.  The only issue of importance to the 
defence was identification.  Neither the race of the complainant nor his testimony of what happened shed any light 
on identification.  In the circumstances of this case, the trial judge did not think that leaving the “interracial” element 
out of the Parks question was unfair.  That is a determination he was entitled to make.  We should not interfere 
simply because we might have concluded in his place that greater reassurance might have been given to the accused 
had the full Parks question been put.” [my emphasis]. It should be noted that paragraph 69 of R. v. Spence is treated 
and cited in Professor Danielle Pinard’s outline entitled “La connaissance d’office en matière factuelle: pistes de 
réflexion” (20.11.2006), p.20. 
299 Robert G. Richards, “Some thoughts on Appellate Advocacy in Constitutional Cases”, (2006) 34 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 
(2d) 19, 27. 
54 
 
Dia DABBY, « Of Eureka Moments and Magic Barometers: Freedom of Religion as the “First” 
Freedom in the Canadian Constitutional Context » 
 
Droits d’auteur et droits de reproduction. Toutes les demandes de reproduction doivent être 
acheminées à Copibec (reproduction papier) – (514) 288-1664 – 1(800) 717-2022. 
licences@copibec.qc.ca 
                                                
 
 
 
2.3 A Child’s Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
 
 
Although children are recognised as rights holders by the Supreme Court of Canada300, 
their right to freedom of religion has posed a particular challenged when coupled with their “best 
interest”, since judgment must be passed in the absence of a “eureka moment”301 determining a 
child’s competency. Recent issues such as a child’s right to refuse a blood transfusion for 
religious reasons in Manitoba302 and British Columbia303, the wearing of religious symbols in 
schools in Québec304, a parent’s right to remove a child from ethics and religious culture class in 
Québec305 or exempt a child from religious “instruction or exercise” in Alberta306 as well as 
funding of religious schools in Ontario307 demonstrate that a child’s right to freedom of religion is 
anything but clear-cut in Canada in 2009. Decisions on a child’s right to freedom of religion 
require not only an evaluation of the child’s rights but also those of the parents. The religious 
community - whose perpetuation can hang in the balance - has also emerged as an under-
examined site of influence308. Moreover, the Canadian Coalition for the Rights of the Child has 
argued, in its 2009 report, that the best interest of the child can be instrumentalised in one of two 
ways with regard to religious practices. First, religious practices either ignore or are given priority 
over any consideration of the child’s interest. Second, religious beliefs are used to justify actions 
that run counter to the provisions of the Convention [on the Rights of the Child]309. By playing on 
 
300 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 71, ¶ 217. 
301 A.C., supra note 75, ¶ 4. 
302 Ibid, ¶ 4. 
303 S.J.B. (Litigation Guardian of) v. British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Service), (2005) 
42 B.C.L.R. (4th) 321 [S.J.B.]. 
304 Multani, supra note 201. 
305 Lavallée, supra note 225; see also Loyola High School c. Courchesne, 2010 QCCS 2631 at ¶ 14, where Dugré J. 
cancelled the Minister of Education’s decision because it was in his view erroneous and unreasonable on the one 
hand and on the other, because it infringed Loyola High School’s right to freedom of religion and freedom of 
religious expression as protected by article 3 of the Québec Charter.  
306 Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Amendment Act, S.A. 2009 c. 26, amending R.S.A. 2000, c. H-
14.  
307 This was a central issue for the Conservatives in the last Ontario election held in September 2007. The 
Conservatives ultimately lost the election and the contested issue of funding of religious schools was cast aside by 
the Ontario Liberals. See Jennifer Wilson, “Faith-Based Schools”, online: < 
http://www.cbc.ca/ontariovotes2007/features/features-faith.html> (site last accessed 28.10.2009).  
308 See Cheryl Milne, “Religious Freedom: At What Age?” (2008/2009) 25 N.J.C.L. 71, 79-80 [Milne, “Religious 
Freedom”]; Van Praagh, “Adolescence, Autonomy and Harry Potter”, supra note 146, 369; and Van Praagh, 
“Protection of “Our” Children”, supra note 260, at 174-175. 
309 CANADIAN COALITION FOR THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, The Best Interests of the Child: Meaning and 
Application in Canada (Report June 25th 2009), online: 
55 
 
Lex Electronica, vol. 15 n°2 (Automne/Autumn 2010) 
 
Droits d’auteur et droits de reproduction. Toutes les demandes de reproduction doivent être 
acheminées à Copibec (reproduction papier) – (514) 288-1664 – 1(800) 717-2022. 
licences@copibec.qc.ca 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
the variable geometry of the best interest of the child, it can be argued that both the State and 
parents aim to regulate the extent of a child’s religious beliefs. Nevertheless, the subtle and direct 
influences of the religious community must also enter into this equation. 
 
The recent case of A.C. embodies the difficulty in identifying whether a proper age exists 
at which a child’s beliefs should be upheld in a court of law. Framed as a question of “competing 
values” between a child’s interests and that of society ‘legitimate’ interest, the shift toward 
“values” is unmistakable310. While sliding scales to determine maturity provide a certain amount 
of manoeuvring room for the adjudicator, it can nonetheless diminish this fundamental freedom to 
a checklist before the law, albeit a contextualised one. A question worthy of further exploration is 
whether such emphasis should be placed on autonomy and free choice, at the expense, it seems, of 
the relationship between the child, parents and the religious community. Indeed, this question has 
been raised both within311 and outside312 of the Canadian context. This approach could also 
provide a counterargument to those who suggest that a child’s right to freedom of religion carries 
little moral weight and does not constitute, strictly speaking, a fundamental right within the 
Canadian context313. This suggestion is mitigated by the fact that freedom of religion could be 
used as a guise to secure non-religious interests, such as the relationship between the child, the 
parents and the community; such crafting of a relationship could be interpreted as opportunistic. 
Moreover, the question of children’s right to religious freedom is not limited to the scope of 
medical decisions, education-related cases, but also questions of child custody and access, as seen 
in Young v. Young314 and P. (D.) v. S. (C.)315, where the Supreme Court had confirmed both 
 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences/BestInterestsChild-Report_en.pdf (site last accessed 23.09.2009), 
pp. 18-19. 
310 See Robert Leckey, “Language and Judgment’s Reach: Reflecting on Limits on Rights” (October 30, 2009). 
University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 60, 2010 [Leckey, “Language and Judgment’s Reach”]. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496884 (site last accessed 23.12.2009), who suggests at page 6 (footnote 15) that 
Mark Antaki [“The Turn to “Values” in Canadian Constitutional Law”, supra note 189] provides a lens for reading 
the Court’s recent Charter jurisprudence, especially A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 
SCC 30 “in which the Court rejected a minor’s (and Jehovah’s Witness’) challenge to the scheme empowering a 
judge to order care contrary to the wishes of a child under sixteen and her parents. Justice Abella referred to 
‘competing values,’ holding together ‘a child’s interest in exercising his or her autonomy’ and ‘society’s legitimate 
interest in protecting him or her from harm’ (ibid. at para. 106 [emphasis added]). Compare Binnie J.’s dissent 
(‘entitlement’ to autonomy and Charter ‘rights’; ibid. at para. 192). “ 
311 See Milne, “Religious Freedom”, supra note 308, 79-80; Van Praagh, “Adolescence, Autonomy and Harry 
Potter”, supra note 146 and Van Praagh, “Protection of “Our” Children”, supra note 260, at 174-175. 
312 See Sylvie Langlaude, “Children and Religion under Article 14 UNCRC: A Critical Analysis” (2008) 16 Int’l J. 
Child. Rts.  475, 502 [Langlaude, “Children and Religion under Article 14 UNCRC”]. 
313 See Luc B. Tremblay, « Les signes religieux à l’école : réflexions sur le Rapport Stasi et les accommodements 
raisonnables » (2004) 48 Arch. Phil. Dr. 169, 179-180 [Tremblay, “Signes religieux à l’école”], who argued at the 
same pages, that freedom of religion presupposes a certain maturity illustrating a person’s capacity of critical and 
autonomous judgment. Moreover, this opinion is accepted in the legal and political tradition of liberalism, drawing 
on Locke and Mill’s conceptions of liberty, tolerance and the harm principle.  
314 Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 [Young]. 
315 P. (D.) v. S. (C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141 [P. (D.)]. 
56 
 
Dia DABBY, « Of Eureka Moments and Magic Barometers: Freedom of Religion as the “First” 
Freedom in the Canadian Constitutional Context » 
 
Droits d’auteur et droits de reproduction. Toutes les demandes de reproduction doivent être 
acheminées à Copibec (reproduction papier) – (514) 288-1664 – 1(800) 717-2022. 
licences@copibec.qc.ca 
                                                
decisions on the basis on the best interests test316. While this study has only touched upon the 
issue of a child’s right to freedom of religion in its broadest sense, this multifaceted subject would 
benefit greatly from further discussion and exchanges in a constitutional law setting. 
  
  
 Conclusion on Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
 
“You say I took the name in vain 
I don't even know the name 
But if I did, well really, what's it to you? 
There's a blaze of light 
In every word 
It doesn't matter which you heard 
The holy or the broken Hallelujah” 
 
- Leonard Cohen, Hallelujah 
 
While poet and singer Leonard Cohen will not strike many (if any) as a leading expert in 
the field of freedom of religion, his crafting of ideas remains unparalleled. Within the lyrics of 
Hallelujah, we uncover the individual and the community, the believed and the perceived, and the 
crafting of public and private space. 
 
This study of freedom of religion in Canada has led us from a time where religious 
freedoms were marginally protected to recognition as a fundamental freedom. In a first section, 
freedom of religion was examined in three waves, in order to arrive at our current constitutional 
standing. The period before the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights proved itself to be a very 
dark era for certain minority groups; in this way, “witnessing” religion provided the observer with 
fractured dialogues on religious values. The enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights offered 
latent or passive protection of religion, simply “observed” in by the legislation, without conferring 
concrete safeguards. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was heralded, since it 
marked a “contextualised” approach to freedom of religion and was entrenched as a fundamental 
freedom. While the framework established by the Supreme Court in Big M Drug Mart still stands, 
having adduced a positive and negative freedom, freedom of religion has emerged further as a 
multifaceted, multilayered and complex right, engaging the State, the individual and the 
community in a heady constitutional discourse. From Sunday closings to opening prayers, the 
significance of the individual becomes clear, as does the need to balance competing views. From 
 
316 Milne, “Religious Freedom”, supra note 308, 76. On the delicate nature of a child’s best interest when coupled 
with their fundamental rights, see Julie Laliberté, who argued that recourse to the Oakes’ test is unnecessary if we 
determine what are truly the interests and fundamental freedoms of the non-autonomous child: Julie Laliberté, La 
liberté de religion et les intérêts de l’enfant au Canada, Master’s thesis, Montréal, Faculté des études supérieures, 
Université de Montréal, 2004, 171.  
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sincere individual beliefs to profoundly communitarian interests, nevertheless, freedom of religion 
is confronted by the reluctant juncture of definitions of religion and sincerely held beliefs. This 
intersection engenders a re-positioning of individual and community interests with regard to 
freedom of religion. Moreover, this juncture points to unresolved issues pertaining to freedom of 
religion. In an effort to address how claims of freedom of religion are addressed, the duty to 
accommodate religion as well as the proportional exercise under Oakes was also briefly 
considered. Exiting our study of freedom of religion, it remains clear that the content of that 
freedom is variable, illustrating the changeable ebb and flow of commitments between the 
individual and the community, on the one hand, and the adjustable nature of beliefs, on the other. 
 
The unresolved issues pertaining to freedom of religion in Canada were addressed in a 
second section. First, the sincerity of the belief of the individual provided a heated legal literature 
discussion on the importance of individual views as well as the many drawbacks implicated in 
this approach, namely the conscious choice of ignoring the importance of the community.  
Second, the place of expert evidence and the impact on community views of religion actually 
conceal a deeper problem of how to handle official religion within the legal discourse. While the 
courts do (and should) not want to become arbiters of religious dogma, it becomes difficult to 
draw the line between arbiter and adjudicator. Moreover, the issue of expert testimony also points 
to who is considered apt to demarcate these public and private zones of importance, effectively 
redefining of public and private space. A question of judicial notice also enters this discussion, 
since what constitutes social facts is no longer clear-cut317. Lastly, a child’s right to freedom of 
conscience and religion has been highlighted as a further issue of discussion and exchange in 
Canada. The variable geometry of the best interest of the child invites a re-imagining of 
belonging318 and therefore a greater attribution of credence to a community’s vision. 
  
Conceptualising the freedoms of religion and conscience in law calls for, I believe, a re-
examination of the quality of the elements composing the belief as well as a more profound 
acknowledgement of the implications of political liberalism in constitutional discourse.  
 
 
317 The very question of admitting “social facts” and “social framework facts” as per Monahan and Walker is 
challengeable and constitutes another subject of study. 
318 Playing on and with apologies to James Tully’s “Reimagining Belonging in Circumstances of Cultural Diversity: 
A Citizen Approach” in Ulf Hedtoft and Mette Hjort, eds., The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity 
(Minneapolis (MN), University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 152-177. 
